The clerical regime in Iran continues to cling to power by making use of a vast surveillance network.
The Iranian regime is vastly unpopular today among a majority of those it has jurisdiction over, both in the diaspora and within its borders. It has always had a contentious history, with a large proportion of people vehemently opposed to the clerical hijacking of the People’s Revolution of ’79. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran did have a large support base in the early years, but it steadily whittled away[1]. The erosion of its popularity and support within Iran and among the diaspora has been activated by a cohort of factors, ranging from dissent against brutal theocratic laws, an erosion of civilian rights of every conceivable nature, anti-women policies and praxis, to a heavy anti-incumbency factor, a decimation of its working-class population, and massive infrastructural deficits.[2]
Non-Persian Nations and the Ethnic Minority Frame
One of the crucial and often overlooked factors for the regime’s mass unpopularity lies in the way it reproduces colonial relations between the Persian and non-Persian regions and people.[3] A highly extractive center-periphery praxis between Tehran and the Baloch-Kurd-Ahwazi nations has time and again revealed the extreme hypocrisy of the theocracy and led to countless revolts and revolutions from these peripheries, challenging the center.[4]
The Shah regime (Pahlavi monarchy) and the current regime of the Islamic Republic are usually seen as being in opposition to one another, but it is more accurate to view them as extensions of each other and two sides of the same coin.[5] They may differ on the role of religion (the Pahlavi dynasty tried to control how Islam was practised rather than ban it), with the Islamic republic embodying a more extreme version of religious control lapsing into a full-blown brutal theocracy. Still, both were dictatorships of varying kinds and converged on the point of ethnic chauvinism and Persian supremacy.
There is a brutal cultural and political assimilation of all non-Persians into the Aryan nation called Iran, and indeed, Iran means ‘land of the Aryans.’ The change in name from Persia to Iran was instituted by the Shah on advice from the Iranian ambassador to Germany, who in turn was influenced by the growing populism of Aryan supremacy in 1930s Germany.
When the clerical class hijacked the 79’ revolution, one of their promises was equality between all, regardless of ethnicity, but even in this specific regard, they have not only been a sad continuation of the old monarchy but have even worsened the material difference between Persian and non-Persian regions. This has taken place via the purposeful underfunding of infrastructure in the non-Persian regions, extensive surveillance systems imposed on so-called separatist Kurds Baloch and Arabs, labelling all non-assimilated and dissenting people as terrorists, diverting resources from periphery to center, heavy militarisation, failure to allow mother tongue education, mockery of ethnic minorities as backwards, parochial, and more. [6]
Apart from its heavy use of technology, the regime also uses ‘plants’ in mosques, universities and in all manner of institutional and interpersonal settings to gather data on disloyal people. Iran’s notoriously violent compulsory hijab laws are an important part of their surveillance systems through which they identify not just women but entire families as being anti-or-pro regimes via their flouting of the hijab laws.
The Enemy Within: Global and Regional Politics
In a geopolitical context, Iran is isolated and very unpopular with both Western governments and Sunni Arab states in the Middle East, with a few notable exceptions. Factoring in the numerous revolts and revolutions from dissident Iranian, Kurdish, Baloch, and Ahwazi citizens and reeling from the recent Jina uprising[7], there is vast internal and external pressure on the regime. It has many enemies, and its paranoia about being ridden by spies is not unfounded. There are indeed countless people and political actors waiting to undermine and topple it from both inside and outside for very different purposes and with various political agendas.
Following a slew of high-level political assassinations on its soil and in the region, notably those of Soleimani[8] (in 2020) and Haniyeh[9](2024), there was widespread talk about someone having leaked information that enabled these lapses in security. Talk about traitors and the ‘enemy within’ has reached astronomical proportions in regime circles, and they have cunningly used these political assassinations as an excuse to go on a rampage, targeting all dissenting and ethnic minority populations.
Even prior to the assassination of Haniyeh, Kurds, who are always configured in the Iranian social imaginary as ‘security threats’, were bombed across the border in the Kurdistan region of Iraq in January this year. The regime labelled this as an attack on a ‘Mossad base’[10]. However, activists and rights groups from the region have proclaimed that this was baseless propaganda and that the targets were, in fact, Kurdish civilians (four were killed and several injured).
Iraqi Kurdish Prime Minister Masrour Barzani described the strikes as a “crime against the Kurdish people”, stating that the Iranian allegations of an Israeli espionage base were without proof and baseless.[11] The regime has also been cracking down on the Baloch region, ramped up executions of political prisoners[12], and stepped up surveillance of Iranians to draconical levels. A few days ago, the journalists who reported on the killing of Jina Amini (Niloufar Hamedi and Elahe Mohammadi) were asked to return to jail after their bail time had lapsed. They were originally sentenced to 13 and 12 years in jail, commuted to the minimum terms of seven and six years respectively, despite the charge of “collaboration with the USA” being dropped.[13]
A Surveillance State
How has the regime managed to survive this long with this many external and internal pressures and threats to its existence? Its longevity can be understood in relation to its complex network of surveillance system capabilities, which it has built up over decades, ranging from highly sophisticated to extremely basic and simple but effective.
Zooming in on the recent Jina uprising in 2022, as per Filter.watch: “Iran experienced over four months of internet blackouts or slowdowns either nationwide or at the provincial level after Mahsa Jina Amini’s death.” [14] The Iranian regime also seems to be moving away from countrywide to region-specific shutdown and more targeted control on specific apps or using spyware to infiltrate popular apps being used. An article contextualizing the Jina revolution illustrates this well. As per Miaan:
Some cities, such as Zahedan, the capital of Balochistan province, have had their internet cut every Friday in conjunction with protests held after Friday prayers. These internet shutdowns in Zahedan have been going on for nearly a year, every Friday, without fail. This represents the most consistent pattern of internet censorship in Iran’s history.
In addition to these shutdowns and disruptions, the Iranian government has also imposed stricter filters on international platforms, such as WhatsApp and Instagram, and enacted legislation that empowers the government to monitor, regulate, and identify individuals based on their online activities. These measures are part of the government’s efforts to curtail freedom of expression and access to the global internet.[15]
Apart from its heavy use of technology, the regime also uses ‘plants’ in mosques, universities and in all manner of institutional and interpersonal settings to gather data on disloyal people. Iran’s notoriously violent compulsory hijab laws are an important part of their surveillance systems through which they identify not just women but entire families as being anti-or-pro regimes via their flouting of the hijab laws.
They then target the friends and family members of suspected dissidents to spy for them, using both stick and carrot methods of remuneration for those efforts. This instils mass fear even in ordinary members of society who are not politically active, and it also becomes habitual that friends or family one has disagreements with on personal issues can use this to lodge complaints with regime forces, under one pretext or another. As can be imagined, this has shattered families in various ways and ruptured communities along multiple lines.
Iran is of geopolitical interest to non-Iranians in both the Global North and South.
Because of Iran’s geopolitical position as a major player in the Middle East and its formation as an Islamic republic, outsiders, both in the West and in the Muslim world, view the region through a highly extractive lens and as a stepping stone for their own political needs and ambitions. Many in the Muslim world view the regime as some kind of bulwark against ‘Western imperial’ interest, paying no attention or care as to who bears the cost for this projection.
This extractive relationship with both the West and Global South, combined with the regime’s draconian security state, means that there is a dearth of news and information from Iranians themselves about the situation there. It is particularly rare for the voices of those living in the geography of Iran and first-generation exiled diasporas to be heard internationally or in the Arab world. The global Left, in particular, must engage with and listen to the Iranian Left despite their differences in political vision for the future.
Keeping this in mind, I would like to end this article with an interview done with an Iranian friend called Mariyam (name changed), who sheds light on the situation vis-à-vis surveillance in Iran, combining her personal experiences and knowledge of it.
It is known that Iran relies heavily on surveillance of its citizens. Can you elaborate on this?
Mariyam: Iran dedicates a massive budget to mass surveillance and extensive spying on people, which has been intensified through time, especially after uprisings.
This surveillance is done through 1) technological devices, such as ( but not limited to) cameras installed throughout the streets and other public places all over the city and
2) [undercover] personal agents who are present report from centers that are considered highly sensitive for the regime, for instance, among the leftist/ intellectual/ writer circles, labor circles (factories, etc.), teachers’ unions, and students’ associations (in universities).
The undercover “agent” is not necessarily limited to being the direct employee of the regime (internally hired for this purpose) but can be local people from the mentioned circles who have been intimidated and/or threatened with punishment, imprisonment, and more by the regime, and thus forced to cooperate.
This is very effective and convenient for the regime because it insinuates itself in every small, private and “filtered” group. There might be someone from your close circle (even a relative) who might turn out to be (or to become) a backstabber and spy revealing information to the authority, which results in a blockade and construction of a fear that once can never fully trust their comrades and each other another.
It plays a role similar to the panopticon, in which there is not always a watcher, but the prisoners constantly feel the heavy weight of the controlling gaze upon them.
The role of technology has made it easier for the regime to spy on people. Can you make a comparison between the crackdown on the broad Left in the 1980s and the recent Jina uprising?
Mariyam: That is for sure. “Your phone is like a cop and almost always against you” is an expression that explains the function of citizens’ smartphones for the regime. It stores detailed information and shows who your close contacts are while archiving your conversation, which can put yourself and others at risk. Besides, phones can easily be hacked, your activities can be monitored, your accurate geographical location can be discovered, etc. When authorities (a team from the regime) raid people’s houses for inspection, they always take their phones with them because it is a valuable source of information. The team can even recover and find deleted contents on one’s phone.
Of course, this technology is a huge help in other ways, too. They can easily find and collect valuable information on people by using face detection technology through millions of photos of people published online on social media. They can monitor people’s social media accounts, the content they post and the causes they promote.
These are all huge shifts from the 80s when they had to only rely on [arrested] individuals to identify and recognize the faces of their friends/comrades/family members who were targeted by the regime or for completing their list. Then, the regime had to invest a lot in “agents” who were trained personnel hired by the regime or political activists who were arrested, subject to torture, forced to collaborate, and give names and identify the targets for the government. Smartphones and computers now do this job to a considerable extent.
An IT expert who was detained in 2017 was talking about mobile networks and how security agents can get to the 16-digit code of the SIM cards in various ways and then gain access to any information exchanged on the mobile phone. Through this method, it is possible to receive a copy of the information from either both sides of conversations or text messages or collectively from all the channels on the social platforms of which the user is a member. The expert explained that in this way, they can enter channels and networks, send fake messages and even hack and control these networks.
Can you tell us about your personal experience with the regime and being surveilled, as well as those of your extended family?
Mariyam: My dad has been summoned by the intelligence service in Iran several times, and in one of these summon sessions, they asked, “Did you know that your computer and phone were monitored by us?” Of course, my dad had suspected and expected it. He describes his situation as “sensing two eyes always watching him for the fifty years”.
I also feel responsible here, and I sense that because of my dad, all my family members are under the radar and monitoring the regime. They would try to find a slip they could deem ‘unlawful’ or something in our activities that could be used against my dad.
How does the regime use its surveillance in the West?
Mariyam: Basically, in every country, the Iranian embassy serves as the spy zone of the Iranian regime for two purposes:
1) Collect information and monitor Iranian citizens in that country. For instance, whenever there are uprisings in Iran and solidary demonstrations are being held outside Iran by Iranians abroad, the employees of the Iranian embassy have the duty to show up and identify people who are present in the demonstrations. Then, these people will be stopped, interrogated, and, in some cases, imprisoned upon arrival to Iran.
2) Sneaking into the security services of the host country. One example is what they are doing in Sweden. Recently, the Iranian regime has been accused of cyberattack and hacking messaging services in Sweden. “The security police are able to establish that a cyber group acted on behalf of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to carry out an influence campaign,” the Swedish Security Service said in a statement.
Can you tell us about fear among the diaspora, about being targeted by the regime or using their families back in Iran as political leverage to stop dissent?
Mariyam: That tactic has been tried out a lot, and so many people have been victims of it. The regime has been holding the close family members of dissidents in exile hostage in exchange for their return to Iran.
How do family and friends serve as spy networks?
Mariyam: One of the tactics of the regime is to trap social, union, and political activists and journalists in a way that forces them to cooperate with the government. That’s why it’s crucial to remain unnoticed and unidentified by the authorities as much as possible. For instance, in the case of targeting labor activists, I have firsthand information that security officers had identified the influential workers and leaders of strikes and protests and had gone to their homes and had threatened their wives and their children by telling them “if they continue their activism, they will lose their job. So, advise them to stop”.
This is a tactical way that might pit family members against each other. Another example similar to this case is that when the regime wants to collect more information about a targeted person, they reach out to their family and friends. In this case, in order to buy that family member/ friend, they might offer them some benefits/privileges in return, or they might only threaten them. But in a lot of cases, “just a call from the intelligence service” might be frightening enough to make that individual cooperate with them and give them what they want “in order to be saved from further trouble.”
What is the regime trying to circumvent by such extensive surveillance?
Mariyam: To spread fear as they thrive on fear. Also, to communicate messages like:
“if you disobey, we will turn your life and the life of your loved ones into hell.”
“you know we watch you, so you’d better stay out of trouble, or we will give you a hard time”.
In this way, by censorship and controlling the media, they aim to control the content and, thus, the minds.
Notes:
[1] A Whole Generation Revolts Against the Iranian Regime – The Atlantic
[2] The Reason Iran Turned Out to Be So Repressive – The Atlantic
[3] Can non-Persians speak? The sovereign’s narration of “Iranian identity” – Kamal Soleimani, Ahmad Mohammadpour, 2019
[4] Ahwazi: Diaspora Remembers April Uprising on 12th Anniversary –
[5] Crafting ‘Art of Persia’: Debates on National and Religious Identity in Contemporary Iran – Ajam Media Collective
[6] Ahwazi, Iranian Kurdistan & West Balochistan: Persecution of Minorities in Iran Discussed in the British House of Commons –
[7] Jin, Jiyan, Azadi and the Historical Erasure of Kurds | International Journal of Middle East Studies | Cambridge Core
[8] Qasem Soleimani: Why kill him now and what happens next?
[9] What happened in Iran and what we know about assassination of Ismail Haniyeh | CNN
[10] Iran’s Revolutionary Guards claim deadly attack they say targeted Israeli installation in Iraq | CBC News
[11] Iran’s Revolutionary Guards claim deadly attack they say targeted Israeli installation in Iraq | CBC News
[13] Journalists Who Reported on Mahsa Jina Amini’s Killing Sentenced to Long Prison Terms – Center for Human Rights in Iran
[14] Iranian government’s digital control tactics are a sophisticated form of repression, says researcher | CBC Radio
[15] Iran’s Year of Defiance and Repression: How One Woman’s Death Sparked a Nationwide Uprising – The Miaan Group Inc
