In Bangladesh, a deeper transformation of the cultural and moral landscape, a slow recalibration of the values that shape how people imagine community, belonging, and the boundaries of the nation itself is afoot, threatening the country’s democratic future.
“The most common way people give up their power is by thinking they don’t have any.” — Alice Walker.
The 2026 parliamentary election in Bangladesh marked an unsettled phase and a profound transition in the nation’s political landscape. With the end of the Sheikh Hasina era and the return of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to power under the leadership of Tareq Rahman, a new form of political reengagement emerged in which Islamists, for the first time, became critical actors in national politics. The emboldened Islamists are now seeking to influence the direction of the state and to redefine the concepts of nation, nationality, and constitutionality within the evolving political terrain.
Hasina’s departure from the political scene marks a deeper structural turning point and is unfolding in ways that are sharpening ideological cleavages among political actors across the spectrum. The post-election scenario is marked by the declining influence of secular-liberal parties, which are restructuring political dynamics and ultimately shaping the trajectory of democracy. Furthermore, the political sphere has not only been transformed by the withdrawal of the Awami League (AL), at least for the moment, but also redefined by the BNP’s inability to establish ideological hegemony in both the state and society. At the same time, the prevalence of theocratic narratives is complicating the lives of vulnerable and marginalized communities—women, secularists, leftists, religious, queer, and ethnic minorities—who face increasing constraints as the ideological spectrum narrows and majoritarian impulses intensify.
This article examines the critical shifts and their overall implications for institutionalizing democracy through the development of inclusive political praxis in Bangladesh. It contends that the growing influence of Islamist ideologues is transforming the core elements of the political architecture and modifying the established normative and behavioral structures that have historically defined the country’s political and social spheres. Collectively, these reconfigurations may derail the nation’s long-standing aspiration for an inclusive democratic path and undermine the rights and protections of marginalized communities.
The cumulative effect of these shifts has made the theocratic lens more powerful than before, and it is being used more frequently to redefine political and social roles and behaviors. Secularism—once written into the very foundation of the Bangladeshi constitution—has gradually become a site of dispute, questioned, reinterpreted, and, in some circles, especially among Islamists and centre-rightists, openly dismissed. What is unfolding is a deeper transformation of the country’s cultural and moral landscape, a slow recalibration of the values that shape how people imagine community, belonging, and the boundaries of the nation itself.
Post‑Hasina Bangladesh: A Fragile Transition
The end of Sheikh Hasina’s consistent fifteen‑and‑a‑half‑year tenure, although marked by significant economic progress, has eroded state institutions, weakened civil society, and reduced the influence and support of liberal, secular parties. All of these factors have substantially contributed to democratic erosion and, in turn, have bred an authoritarian trend that many scholars describe as a hybrid regime, given its mixture of democratic elements and authoritarian practices in governance. While elections took place as scheduled, it was clear that the ruling party would secure an absolute victory in a controlled, staged process in which the state apparatus was used to advance its agenda. This ultimately led to further democratic decline, fostering a false sense of stability while limiting civil freedoms, undermining civil society, and sidelining opposing political voices.
The recent Bangladesh election fell far short of democratic consolidation; instead, it underscores the deterioration of democracy. The Election Commission, often criticized for its bias toward ruling parties, has shown a questionable ability to conduct inclusive elections that reflect all political opinions on the ballot. The judiciary, influenced by political interference, continues to reflect a legacy of loyalty to the government since its independence. Likewise, the bureaucracy lacks the institutional independence needed to support democratic values. With these institutional shortcomings contributing to a political environment in which the formalities of democratic practice persist, the protections that lend credibility to these processes remain precarious.
The political parties enter this transitional period without the preparation or capacity needed to steer it effectively. The major parties have consistently faced issues with personalized leadership, weak internal democracy, and a lack of ideological clarity and vision to move the nation forward by including all its fragments in the development process. When there are no robust, policy-focused parties capable of articulating a democratic agenda, the political landscape is more vulnerable to influence from various groups that offer alternative forms of legitimacy.
As institutions begin to erode, the space for a new ideology to replace older ones expands. In periods of political transition, familiar structures start to wobble, and unexpected openings emerge for new actors to redefine what authority should look like. In Bangladesh, Islamist parties and organizations have carried out their political, social, and cultural agendas with striking confidence, casting themselves as protectors of moral order, cultural rootedness, and religious authenticity. Their rise reveals not only the gradual decline of secular moral values but also the shifting social and cultural currents beneath the surface. The growing influence of theo-political ideology reflects, in many respects, deeper social shifts that have quietly been underway for years.
Hasina’s leadership revealed the limits of justifying political legitimacy through development narratives when the electoral process was not genuinely inclusive. For many years, the government has relied on economic growth, infrastructure development, and social welfare initiatives to garner political backing. However, such development cannot replace democratic legitimacy, nor can it compensate for the decline in institutional independence. As the political landscape changes, the lack of robust democratic institutions becomes more evident, prompting concerns about the country’s future political direction.
Islamist Influence and the Reconfiguration of Power
One of the most notable aspects of the post-election environment is the visible influence of Islamist parties and groups on both the state and its surrounding social landscape. This impact has not emerged suddenly; rather, it is the result of a gradual process—characterized by years of social mobilization, subtle institutional integration, and a strategic relationship with the state.
Over time, Islamist organizations have integrated themselves into the daily lives of communities. Through madrasas, mosques, charitable organizations, and local institutions, they have created a complex network of connections and mutual responsibilities. This gradual, ongoing transformation is not only the outcome of strong organizational networks but also the creation of a dense ideological ecosystem that shapes public opinion, social norms, and political behavior. In various ways, this ecosystem has established an alternative moral framework that significantly influences public sentiment and societal norms, in contrast to formal political approaches and social behaviors. All of these, especially the roles of the Islamist influencers and organizations, have created the conditions for Islamist politics to take root and expand their influence in national politics.
During the Hasina era, the government selectively accommodated Islamist demands and engaged with specific Islamist parties and groups as part of its strategy to create division among them. This resulted in the recognition of Qawmimadrasa degrees and the patronage of various Islamist influencers and religious institutions by both the government and members of the ruling party. Accommodating particular sects of Islamists while distancing others was often justified as a pragmatic strategy to weaken the Islamists, but in reality, it helped consolidate their leverage simultaneously at the state and societal levels.
In the post-Hasina period, the influence of Islamist actors has intensified. They now play a crucial role as key players in the political terrain, influencing the tone and content of policy discussions, and positioning themselves as key arbiters of social legitimacy. Their imprint is present across various aspects of public life—whether in debates over education reform, disputes surrounding gender policy, decisions about cultural programs, or the tightening of digital regulations. Gradually, the Islamists started playing the role of moral gatekeepers, defining standards for acceptable behavior, authentic culture, and religious expression. In many ways, they also became guardians of a normative order that began shaping the actions of both political actors and ordinary citizens.
The rising influence of Islamist ideologies is reinforced by the apparent, silent, but powerful gradual transformations that have taken place over a four-decade period, which have played a vital role in changing individuals’ traditional perceptions of faith, identity, and belonging. Facebook feeds, YouTube channels, and a new generation of digital preachers, along with madrasa-educated youth, are playing an important role in shaping society’s moral and cultural values. In their narratives, true faith, moral purity, and cultural protection become non-negotiable ideals, while those who think otherwise are subtly portrayed as jeopardizing the community’s unity. This ultimately emboldens and benefits Islamist parties and groups. In contrast, other political parties, whether mainstream or secular-leftist, have not been able to develop and spread powerful counter-narratives through digital platforms to challenge this trend. The absence of counter‑narratives has cultivated a theocracy‑influenced public sphere where intolerance toward political, cultural, or religious dissent is growing, and conformity is increasingly praised.
This shift has serious implications for the trajectory of an inclusive democratic pathway. While most Islamist parties participate in electoral politics, their ideological orientations often contradict the principles of democratic norms. Their advocacy of majoritarian rule, moral regulation, and cultural homogeneity resists pluralism, dissent, and minority rights—the very foundations of any functional democracy. As a result, the expanding influence of Islamist actors gradually narrows the ideological spectrum and constrains the space for secular‑liberal values and pluralistic cultural practices at the social level—components essential to a vibrant democracy.
The cumulative effect of these shifts has made the theocratic lens more powerful than before, and it is being used more frequently to redefine political and social roles and behaviors. Secularism—once written into the very foundation of the Bangladeshi constitution—has gradually become a site of dispute, questioned, reinterpreted, and, in some circles, especially among Islamists and centre-rightists, openly dismissed. What is unfolding is a deeper transformation of the country’s cultural and moral landscape, a slow recalibration of the values that shape how people imagine community, belonging, and the boundaries of the nation itself.
Gender, Sexuality, and the Politics of Exclusion
The growing impact of Islamist ideology has significantly affected vulnerable and marginalized groups. Individuals who identify as queer, along with women, secularists, leftists, and religious minorities, are experiencing heightened limitations as the ideological landscape constricts and majoritarian sentiments grow stronger. Their narratives highlight the human toll of the nation’s ideological shift.
Alongside the pressures faced by queer individuals, women’s rights, too, have begun to feel the tightening of the ideological grip. The country’s long‑celebrated gains—girls entering classrooms in unprecedented numbers and women moving into factories, offices, and public life—have appeared increasingly fragile during Mohammad Yunus’s interregnum. In the post‑election BNP period, these hard‑won achievements continue to sit uneasily within a political climate where ideological backlash can swiftly turn progress into vulnerability. For many women, the question is no longer simply whether advancement will continue, but whether the freedoms they have already secured can withstand the shifting ideological winds in the days ahead.
Secularists and liberals have faced a different but equally troubling set of challenges during Yunus’s interregnum. The ideological space for secular political thought has narrowed sharply, with critics of religious conservatism frequently labeled as anti‑Islamic or as agents of foreign influence. The killings of bloggers and freethinkers in previous years produced a climate of fear that continues to shape public life even after the election under BNP rule. Many secular activists have withdrawn from visible political engagement, fearing reprisals from extremist groups or legal harassment by the state. The result is a steadily shrinking arena for critical thought, dissent, and ideological diversity. Thus far, BNP governance has offered little indication that the long‑standing pattern of vilifying secular and liberal voices will diminish in the foreseeable future.
Under Yunus’s interim government, the vulnerability and instability experienced by religious minorities—especially Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and Ahmadiyyas—rose significantly. While post-election-related violence has historically targeted minority communities disproportionately, the frequency of such violence has substantially reduced in this post-election period. However, the mobilization of clerical groups against perceived blasphemy, which was evident during Yunus’s government, continues with alarming frequency. The strong presence of a narrow view of religious identity, along with the ongoing sense of insecurity and exclusion felt by minority communities, may persist in the coming days unless the BNP-led government develops sustainable alternative policies and narratives to counter these trends.
Bangladesh now stands at a delicate crossroads. The post‑election political scene reveals a deeply polarized ideological terrain and an increasingly pro‑Islamist‑influenced, fragile political system, creating anxiety about the trajectory of the nation’s long‑cherished aspiration for inclusive democracy. The effects are particularly severe for marginalized communities—political, religious, and gender‑based—whose identities and everyday struggles collide with the values and ideologies of the proponents of theo‑politics. These trends raise serious concerns about the future of democratic governance in Bangladesh. A central question, therefore, persists: whether the nation can align its development ambitions with the imperatives of ideological freedom and sociopolitical inclusivity.
The ongoing effort to establish an inclusive political system remains unresolved, and the outcomes of this political contestation will determine whether Bangladesh moves toward a more inclusive democratic future or regresses into a more exclusive, majoritarian political framework.
