The July uprising and democratic transition in Bangladesh brought contrasting fortunes for women from different class backgrounds.
“I want things to go back to the way they were before.” “Whoever can, takes bribes.” “In business, communication and relationships matter more than religious or political affiliations.” These phrases rang out as I talked to women who run agricultural businesses across Bangladesh at the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026. My time in Bangladesh, speaking with women and making my own observations, illuminated the class divisions at the heart of society. I met women from diverse backgrounds, from those who sold vegetables and fruit on the street to those with hundreds of employees and who work with international companies and organizations. These women felt the impacts of the political climate personally and economically, yet their experience was not uniform. The democratic transition treated them differently.
The current situation is not the first instance of democratic transition in Bangladesh. Partition, the Liberation War, military dictatorship, student uprisings, caretaker governments—Democratic transition has not been a straight line. The oldest woman I talked to was 12 years old during the Liberation War; the youngest was born in the new millennium. Despite their vast age difference, both have experienced repeated democratic transitions. When the Awami League came to power in 2008, the elections were considered among the most free and fair since the reintroduction of parliamentary democracy in the country (Shehabuddin, 2014).
Before that, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) was in power and faced accusations of corruption and extortion, much as the steadily increasing accusations lodged against the Awami League since 2014 (Arafat & Fahmida, 2025; Shehabuddin, 2014). The student uprising in 2024 seemed to herald a new future for Bangladesh focused on meritocracy, democratic principles, and an end to corruption.
A democratic transition for women may mean more of the status quo unless women are enabled to be active members of the transition. Women of lower socio-economic status experienced the aftereffects more prolonged: social limits on going outside as demonstrations increased, reduced access to and security of taking loans, and smaller bribes to be paid to political officials. Women of the middle class are limiting their movements and experiencing limits to their businesses due to a lack of support and export opportunities. On the other hand, upper-class women may have supported the uprising but were able to either enhance their political participation or ignore it completely.
Throughout these bouts of political upheaval, women in agriculture have been expected to provide food and fiber. For working-class women, political changes have impacted their lives in numerous ways. The democratic transition has continuously affected their lives. I spoke to women who sold their goods at a bazaar in the middle of Dhaka. During the 2006–2008 political crisis, a bazaar was created for footpath sellers in a neighborhood. They could sell their goods without paying a tax on their stalls. After the government was elected, the taxes and bribes came. And they kept increasing, causing women to take loans just to pay the bribes and taxes. Those in power demanded: pay or be thrown out. Yet, this experience was not universal.
The Awami League prioritized women’s empowerment during their administration. Several constitutional amendments and legislative initiatives supported women’s rights and political participation (Abdelaziz, 2025; Shehabuddin, 2014). Both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, from BNP, aimed to enhance women’s political participation, employment, and development while they and their respective parties were in office (Khondker, 2017; Shehabuddin, 2014). For the Awami League, development initiatives included funding credit programs, family planning, girls’ education, and efforts to prevent child marriage (Nazneen, 2023). That credit occasionally ended up in officials’ pockets rather than strengthening employment and development, but when it reached those it intended to, women in agriculture were supported.
For women in agriculture, the Awami League’s policies made it easier for them to obtain microloans from NGOs and the government. Loan and credit schemes included Special Agricultural Credit, Agricultural Fund Target, small and medium enterprise and agriculture-based industry loans, and support for female farming groups (Bangladesh Awami League, 2023; Shakhawat, 2024; The Business Standard, 2023; United Nations in Bangladesh, 2024).
Women I talked to spoke about how the loans enabled them to start their business. They could buy a cow or a plot of land and start farming. When they were successful, their families and communities flocked behind them. They have become pillars of their communities. Loans opened the door for many women in agriculture. When the government changed, these loans dried up or ceased to be a focus for lending agencies. Interest rates soared, making it harder for women in agriculture to access and repay loans. So, they stopped taking them, limiting their ability to engage in business and development.
Women in agriculture who had political connections with Awami League officials through business groups experienced exponential growth during the Awami League administration. These groups provided training and created social networks. I stumbled onto one online group that at its height had 1.4 million members. Select women were chosen from this group for special opportunities, exporting abroad, teaching other women, and recruiting more women.
The women in charge of regions and divisions increased their social networks tenfold. Reaching across the country with their goods and services, getting national-level business grants and mentorship, and eventually exporting around the world. Working with these businesses became a signpost for political approval. When the government fell, so did these groups. Women who experienced a boon during the Awami League government now found themselves without customers, without the ability to export, and without connections.
Some companies abroad, unsure of the future of Bangladesh, paused their relationships even if they weren’t politically connected. Because of the internet blackout, women with agricultural e-commerce businesses ground to a halt.
Many agricultural businesses in this new context failed. They had an abundance of product and no one to sell it to. The women who had developed connections outside these business groups and had local support were able to bounce back and recover after the social shock. Though some are still struggling and continue to do so, due to the changing socio-political environment.
In the most recent transition to democracy, the Awami League came to burn down the bazaar as they were ousted. This was one of the bazaars I visited. The vendors in the bazaar banded together to protect their goods. Some goods got damaged, and some vendors were shot. But the people and the bazaar remain and continue to make a living. During the interim period, BNP came in and started doling out bribes, but at least it was only 60 taka per day, compared to the 300 taka per day under the Awami League. But still, these vendors treat each other like family. I saw the community and support amongst some vendors in the bazaar. While I was speaking with one woman, several other vendors came by and listened in, interjecting occasionally to make sure she was getting something in return for our conversation. Once they felt they could trust me, after asking me questions about myself and my family, they went back to their stalls.
For women in the upper class, life under the Awami League and the political transition was distinctly different. The upper-class women I spoke with could opt in or out of the political discourse. For some, they paid the political workings no mind. The political machinations didn’t touch them. Mirpur DOHS was still pristine, guards still manned the booths, and kids still played in the street. Life went on.
Others, while directly impacted by Awami League policies, laughed at the ridiculousness of the Awami League. Criticizing Sheikh Hassina as a trailblazer in women’s and digital entrepreneurship because they were there first. They were doing the work for years before the government was on board. They were in the trenches with small-holder farmers and agricultural SME’s supporting their work before it was fashionable. The democratic transition didn’t impact the businesses of these upper-class women because they were already operating without it.
Working-class women outside of Dhaka had it a little differently. In Rajshahi, it is common to see women selling vegetables on the footpath. These women see the comings and goings of all people; they also get to know political members. An Awami League member routinely gave a woman footpath seller extra money and food after learning her story. The member fled during the commotion, and she had to adjust to that lack of interpersonal support.
The uprising also provided an opportunity for some women. After the police force was suspended, neighborhoods began their own patrols to prevent robberies and burglaries (The Business Standard, 2024). Women, including women in agriculture, joined these groups. These groups gave neighbors an opportunity to get to know each other and build a stronger sense of community, which is rare in Dhaka, especially. One woman told me that her neighborhood asked her to stand for a local election because of the connections she had built. The democratic transition helped provide more avenues for some women of the upper middle class and upper class to participate in the political process.
When I was in Rajshahi, it was quieter, with fewer demonstrations and political posters than what I saw in Dhaka and Chittagong. From the hotel, you would barely notice the political fire happening in the eaves and alleys. Here, I learned more about the political situation leading up to the student uprising. Rajshahi is considered by some to have stoked the fire of the uprising when a local university student died after being hit by a truck outside of a residential hall (Rajshahi University Correspondent, 2022). Awami League did the bare minimum to prevent future deaths, disregarding students’ concerns.
The quiet unease that seemed to characterize the demonstrations and the country’s atmosphere during my first month shifted drastically when I was in Dhaka.
When Hadi was shot, I was in Dhanmondi. The ramifications of his death reached me, my interpreter, and my family in Bangladesh. We avoided Shahbag like the plague, knowing the amount and fury of the demonstrations would only increase. The atmosphere of Dhaka changed after his death. There was a solemnity over the people and a fury in the demonstrations. The hope for the country’s future seemed to diminish. Hadi proposed a new future, a different option than the old political parties and alliances. To me, BNP didn’t seem much different from Awami League, at least in practice. They were still playing the same game. Hadi and his political platform talked about a new game, a new option.
As we got closer to the elections, especially after Hadi’s death, demonstrations became more frequent. In Comilla, we would hear young men chanting political slogans as they marched down the street. These demonstrations were becoming a regular part of life. One night, my family and I went out to eat some fuchka. As we were coming home, a demonstration was forming just outside the house. Men were shouting and marching, coming down the street packed with people. Our rickshaw would not take us any further than the edge of the throngs.
The demonstrations were overwhelmingly composed of young men, with women few and far between. We had to weave around people to get home. When we arrived, we all checked to make sure everyone was alright, worried that some of the younger sisters may have tripped or been hurt while trying to weave through the masses. This was one of the few times I was happy that I was wearing a salwar kameez, doing my best to blend in.
For women selling on the footpath, increased demonstrations made their livelihoods riskier. Already beholden to neighborhood gossip and subject to solicitations of opportunity, demonstrations made it harder for them to sell their goods. Women on the street grew scarcer as the weeks wore on. When I arrived in November, we saw one woman every day, often until nearly midnight, selling what she could in the winter.
As December turned to January, rarely did I see her at her cart. The cart was usually closed, interspersed with her husband occasionally manning their only source of income. It is hard to separate the ongoing political demonstrations from seeing fewer women selling on the streets in Comilla.
For some women, it was worse. Gender-based violence increased after the student uprising, from harassment to rape (Das, 2025; UNB, 2024). Even though I went to Bangladesh at the end of 2025, my interpreter warned me about the footbridges. She cautioned me against using them, especially at night. The fear of this violence has restricted women’s mobility.
A democratic transition for women may mean more of the status quo unless women are enabled to be active members of the transition. Women of lower socio-economic status experienced the aftereffects more prolonged: social limits on going outside as demonstrations increased, reduced access to and security of taking loans, and smaller bribes to be paid to political officials. Women of the middle class are limiting their movements and experiencing limits to their businesses due to a lack of support and export opportunities. On the other hand, upper-class women may have supported the uprising but were able to either enhance their political participation or ignore it completely.
The women of the working class were the most impacted personally because of their proximity to the demonstrations and the literal line of fire. Middle-class women in agriculture, especially those empowered under Sheikh Hasina, faced business challenges or were unable to withstand the political shock. Upper-class women were the least touched but have the most to gain in terms of political engagement, if they so choose. With BNP back in power, the future of Bangladesh seems uncertain. While I would love to be optimistic about its political future, I fail to see how a democratic transition that leaves half the population behind can be truly democratic and meritocratic.
References
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