“Every action has a reaction”: How Backlash as a Counter-revolutionary Tactic Stifles Youth-led Movements in India

Share this:

The current youth-led movement’s attempt in India to hold the State and society accountable is met with a mix of anti-constitutional approaches to uphold the Brahmanical patriarchal order.

In May 2026, when Chief Justice of India Surya Kant contemptuously referred to the unemployed young people as ‘cockroaches’ to dehumanize them and delegitimize their concerns, it became the final straw that broke the camel’s back. India has witnessed a youth bulge1 since the early 2000s, but decades of faulty educational, examination, and employment systems have led to catastrophic disappointment among youth about their futures, a demographic disaster economists have termed.2 On top of these systematic government failures in guaranteeing constitutional rights to its young people, labelling the youth as cockroaches for questioning the government concerning their fundamental rights wasn’t taken lightly by Gen Z.3

They turned the insult into a movement (in India), calling themselves the Cockroach Janata Party (CJP), and led a campaign to make the Indian education minister resign over problems with medical entrance exam paper leaks.

As this youth-led movement forced a massively arrogant government to listen, many commentators have focused on how social media (specifically Instagram) and other on-ground strategies helped the CJP mobilize Gen Z, who were otherwise seen as apathetic.4 However, what is less focused on is the “backlash” of the ruling government (and with them the ruling elites), which attempts to recover from this “temporary” shock quickly to maintain the status quo in both State and social power.

Ambedkar and Omvedt argue that Indian history can be seen as a structural battle between Shramanic and Brahmanic traditions, where any attempt to bring democratic equity through bloodless revolutions has been met with violent, systemic backlash designed to restore the status quo and maintain hierarchical power distribution. Over the last three millennia, different strategies have been used to quell these forces of regeneration, whether through Buddhism, the Bhakti movement, the anti-caste revolutionaries of the 19th/20th century, or the social contract enshrined in the Indian Constitution.

Before the CJP-led movement even took substantial form on the ground, the BJP, RSS, and the larger Sangh Parivar5 backlash started showing its fangs. When the usual branding of terrorists, anti-nationals, and puppets of foreign agenda didn’t gain any traction, the digital restrictions on social media and police action against demonstrators were used to crush the movement. Still, as Gen Z’s voices grew stronger, the Sangh Parivar used appropriative strategies to pacify the movement without letting it disturb the implicit Brahmanical patriarchal structure that decides who can speak and who can appear as political subjects.

In this article, I read the Sangh Parivar’s backlash against young people through an Ambedkarite lens on Indian history, framing it as a struggle between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces. I connect this backlash to the structural aspects of Brahmanical functioning to illuminate the strategies that allow a façade of procedural democracy while keeping hierarchical, oppressive logic intact.

The purpose of the article is to understand these counter-revolutionary tactics so we can resist and dismantle them. However, before we discuss backlash, we must understand the dominant conception of youthhood in Indian context, since the backlash emerges specifically from this perspective

Conception of Youthhood in India

A key thing the Sangh Parivar backlash (which holds both State and social power currently) illuminated was its understanding of youthhood. Youthhood globally is understood as a time of transition to adulthood (between ages 15–24/29/35 years as defined in different global and local youth policies) where young people make important decisions of their life – concerning education, employment, marriage, family, friendships and community, migration, etc. and the importance of having agency and support through this phase to become independent, emotionally mature adults (Grant & Furstenberg 2007). However, this general understanding of youthhood doesn’t necessarily apply in India, where the dominant culture views young people quite differently (Chatterjee & Walsh 2010).

Adults view youthhood with much anxiety and feel compelled to control the decisions young people make about their own lives (called adultism6), whether about education, employment, marriage, starting a family (or not), or the geography/region they want to live/work in. Any challenge to the decision made by adults, especially about marriage, is met with different kinds of physical, emotional, financial, and social ostracization of the young person. It is akin to how a woman or a person from a specific caste is expected to know their social place in Brahmanical patriarchy to not disturb the social hierarchies; a young person also has a designated social place and should merely follow the decisions made by adults about their lives.

In this larger context of youthhood in India, these youth protests stood out. They stood out for their deliberate use of irreverent humour to mock adults, especially those in power. The use of memes, irreverent language, and puns challenged the core of India’s hierarchical social structure that governs formal and informal uses of power. This mocking humour has faced backlash in India for a while, as we have seen many cases of stand-up comics being hounded by the police and political party members for making fun of their leaders.7

Compared with the US (and other countries), where political satire has been an established cultural practice for decades, India’s case is different. People in power take themselves quite seriously and are highly sensitive to mockery. Humor that mocks people in power has long been a weapon of the weak to challenge hierarchies embedded in social and institutional structures, even if only temporarily.8

Traditionally, spaces also existed to contain such disruptions of hierarchy, where people in power could be mocked in a contained manner. However, with social media, the boundaries of such contained humour have diminished, increasing insecurity among people in power, as any small quip can snowball into a major disruption. Thus, backlash against mocking humor stems from this insecurity about losing power, and authorities often use disproportionate force to quell it, as seen on 20th July 2026 and then throughout October 2026, when the police (on the government’s order) used a range of legitimate and illegitimate means (including Sangh Parivar goons) to contain the protesters’ march to parliament.

This kind of mocking humour becomes even more uncomfortable when it is used by young girls; therefore, the backlash was stronger, as it was interpreted as a “culture shock.”9 Young girls are seen not as dignified autonomous human beings, but as bodies and minds to be controlled; otherwise, it can lead to all kinds of social disruptions, especially of inter-caste/inter-faith unions.

Thus, killing of one’s own daughters for oppressor-caste households is not seen as the worst form of fratricide but as a legitimate way to maintain “honour”, which is strongly supported by the rest of the community (khap panchayats10). Even worse is when young girls from marginalized and minoritized backgrounds raise their voice and assert their agency as they are seen to be challenging hierarchies of gender, caste, religion and age all at once (what a horror!).

Here the role of young men from oppressor castes becomes very crucial for the survival of Brahmanical patriarchal social order. If savarna11 men are not properly inducted into this system, surrendering their agency to adults in their brahmacharya12 phase in exchange for the promise of full power after adulthood, it can pose a major threat to the social hierarchical order.

As many young savarna men joined the CJP-led movement, it created a huge insecurity among the Sangh Parivar about the continuity of their system.13Mohan Bhagwat, the chief of RSS, had to come out in open and pacify young savarna men that ‘we are not against you but interested in listening to your concerns (till the time you don’t disturb the social order)’. To not let go of their hold on this important demographic, a carefully crafted backlash was orchestrated to mobilize savarna men (and women) against reservation/affirmative action.

The timing of this anti-reservation movement to polarize the youth on caste lines and re-attract young savarna men (and women) to Sangh Parivar with the promise of social and State power in the future was too difficult to miss (CJP movement got its demand of resignation of education minister met on 25th July 2026 and Reservation Hatao Andolan Instagram page started on the same day).14In the recent protests, it also observed that savarna women have been joining such movements with “Brahmanwad and Manusmriti Zindabad” (Long Live Brahmanism and Manusmriti) slogans which has been ironically compared to ‘chickens supporting KFC’ memes.15

This counter-revolutionary strategy also shows that the fractures of caste, class, gender, and religion among youth are easily appropriated by ruling elites to dismantle the solidarities that a movement like CJP is trying to build. CJP themselves are trying to figure out how to navigate the fascist State and social power while building solidarities among the different demographics of youth in India, which is an extremely unenviable task with a lot of pitfalls.16

However, the analysis above clearly shows the tactics used by Brahmanical forces, and the best way to break this continuity is to disrupt the intergenerational transfer of hierarchies to younger generations. Youth do have a choice (not individually, but socially) about whether to continue oppressive social structures, though they are never empowered to make these decisions (for obvious reasons!). Also, the promise of power over others (rather than real empowerment) is an easy trap many savarna youths, like Swantantra Bharadwaj and Ruchi Tiwari, fall into. Thus, building solidarities across socio-economic locations and collectively figuring out how to break the cycle of this hierarchical reproduction is the larger task that this youth movement has.

“Every action has a reaction”: Understanding Backlash from the Dialectic of Revolution and Counterrevolution

To further contextualize this backlash historically, one needs to look at the thesis of revolution and counterrevolution proposed by Dr BR Ambedkar and later developed by Gail Omvedt (2003, 2008) and Sebastian Kappen (2019). Although Ambedkar couldn’t finish his writing on this topic completely (later published posthumously in 1987), and the historical understanding of the relationship between Buddhism, Brahmanism and Islam has also been updated,17 he does make a convincing claim regarding the cyclical nature of history in India that Omvedt and Kappen substantiate further in their works.

Ambedkar and Omvedt argue that Indian history can be seen as a structural battle between Shramanic (labour/land-based) and Brahmanic (hierarchy-based) traditions, where any attempt to bring democratic equity through bloodless revolutions18 has been met with violent, systemic backlash designed to restore the status quo and maintain hierarchical power distribution. Over the last three millennia, different strategies have been used to quell these forces of regeneration, whether it was Buddhism, the Bhakti movement, the anti-caste revolutionaries of the 19th/20th century, or the social contract enshrined in the Indian Constitution.

Kappen frames these counter-revolutionary strategies as mechanisms of symbolic fusion, integration, and repulsion, deployed to appropriate or suppress the revolutionary impulse, creating phases of backlash he terms “cyclical regression,” in which dominant forces absorb or subjugate any fundamental challenge to the core logic of Brahmanical patriarchy (Siddiqui 2022). At every historical phase, we can witness a mix of these strategies that are employed to carefully craft the backlash.

In the contemporary context, State backlash has been framed in a specific way. This framing naturalizes and legitimizes the backlash by invoking Newton’s 3rd law of motion: “every action has an equal and opposite reaction.” Whether it is the current prime minister (then chief minister of Gujarat) during the anti-Muslim riots of 2002, when he said – “A chain of action and reaction is going on” to justify his presiding over the riots without stopping them, or the Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Eknath Shinde, who said on the vandalism of the venue of Kunal Kamra’s pun in 2025 – “There is a reaction to every action.”

However, this is not very different from what Congress leader Rajiv Gandhi said in 1984 on the anti-Sikh riots, after the assassination of then prime minister Indira Gandhi – “Whenever a big tree falls, the earth shakes a little.” Though none of the reactions was ever equal in measure or legitimacy, they were always disproportionately stronger, using the full might of the State and social power. Violence and police action have been used strategically on minoritized/marginalized communities to set an example and create a culture of fear, while the promise of power over others has been used to lure the dominant groups to obstruct any scope of building solidarity among the people.

Reading this self-articulated “reaction” as essentially a counter-revolutionary phrase, one needs to be sharply analytical about how it’s deployed to maintain the status quo by people in social and State power throughout India’s history. Post-independence, the Indian Constitution is yet another attempt to bring values of justice, liberty, equality, dignity and fraternity to create a sense of solidarity and social citizenship in a deeply hierarchical society. And the current youth-led movement is foregrounding this social contract to make the “actions” of the State and society accountable to it, but what we see is more of a “reaction” to stifle the revolutionary consciousness embedded in the Constitution.

During the ongoing October protests, State is again trying to justify its disproportionately strong reaction (Central Delhi being put in curfew with more than 40,000 security professionals alongwith Sangh Parivar goons) on the peaceful protestors by claiming it’s a reaction to how unruly they got during the July protests.

Thus, when we look at the Sangh Parivar’s current strategies to quell the youth-led movement, we see a similar mix of anti-Constitutional approaches, forceful suppression, placative appropriation, and the good old emotional coercion adults often use to control youth in their families. Beyond understanding how these counter-revolutionary tactics maintain Brahmanical patriarchal order, one must focus on keeping the revolutionary impulse from collapsing into cyclical regression (Kappen 2019).

As discussed above, the key to preventing this hierarchical order from reproducing is to fearlessly challenge hierarchies of age, gender, caste, class, sexuality, religion, and ability, and to build solidarities among the diverse marginalized and privileged groups imagined by our Constitution. It is not enough to get the current government accountable to people but addressing the deeper concerns raised by young women, Dalit, Adivasi and Muslim youth to smash patriarchy, as well as hierarchies of caste, class, religion, region, sexualities. Hence, building cross-community solidarities and dismantling hierarchies will be this youth-led movement’s biggest challenge in the coming days.

Image: Sumita Roy Dutta/Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0)

 

Notes:

  1. https://theprint.in/opinion/security-code/youth-bulge-youth-bust-unemployment-crisis/3028652/
  2. https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/india-demographic-dividend-waiting-crisis-electoral-delays-development-gap/article71036242.ece
  3. Gen Z is a popularly used label for the present young generation (born between 1997-2012), but it has been problematized because it flattens the immense differences in caste, class, gender, religion, sexuality, ability, and region among youth. The only thing uniting them presently is the breakdown of all institutions that promised them a dignified life and hope for the future. 
  4. There is a tremendous amount of writing on the CJP and the youth-led movement that has emerged since July. See https://theconversation.com/how-gen-z-and-indias-cockroach-janata-party-are-successfully-challenging-narendra-modi-289093 and https://frontline.thehindu.com/politics/cjp-gen-z-protest-india/article71305131.ece
  5. A detailed study on the hydra-headed monster nature of Sangh Parivar has been conducted by Dr. Felix Pal of the University of Western Australia alongside political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot at Sciences Po’s Centre for International Studies (CERI), and fact-checked and published interactively as The RSS Project by The Caravan
  6. For more on the moral panic among adults about “undisciplined youth” in India, please see https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/johs.12387 and  https://www.youthandpolicy.org/articles/oppressed-in-the-shadows/
  7. Kunal Kamra’s case is emblematic (along with others like Munawar Farooqui, Pulkit Mani, etc.) as he was hounded by political party workers with impunity and the venue of his show was destroyed – https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/no-country-for-comedy-on-stand-up-comedian-and-maharashtra/article69373546.ece
  8. There are plenty of satirical traditions historically in India that have found ways to speak truth to power through humor; check https://www.thegeostrata.com/post/punchlines-and-power-plays-tracing-the-roots-of-indian-satire and https://centreforcontemporaryfolklore.org/2025/01/23/the-tale-beyond-the-spectacle-subversion-and-social-commentary-in-theyyam-and-ottamthullal/ 
  9. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/in-modis-gen-z-outreach-parents-are-the-key-target/article71314553.ece
  10. Khap word: Khap is used mostly in parts of northern India and denotes feudal customary councils of clans where adult men take decisions for the entire community https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/26330024231219703
  11. Savarna literally means one with a varna/caste. Depending on context, it denotes oppressive caste communities.
  12. Brahmacharya is the first phase of a person’s life according to Vedic texts, covering childhood and youth, followed by grihastha (householder), vanaprastha (retirement), and sanyasa (renunciation).
  13. Many commentators have only seen this group as a vote bank of the BJP, and that’s why they are not being brutally suppressed as they do with Dalit, Adivasi or Muslim youth. However, the deeper roots of keeping young savarna men and women in the Brahmanical fold are a bigger anxiety that commentators often miss. It goes beyond the electoral calculations and that’s why BJP and RSS also differ in their stands sometimes.  
  14. The case of Swatantra Bharadwaj is emblematic of this strategy, as he boasted of using police shoes and lathis, and committing violence even to the extent of murder with complete impunity and full support of the State and social power. https://frontline.thehindu.com/politics/swatantra-bhardwaj-bjp-violence/article71437936.ece
  15. A deeper analysis of the bargain that savarna women get by supporting Brahmanical patriarchy has been done by feminist scholars like Uma Chakravarti, J Devika and Sharmila Rege. A recent article also looks at the case of Ruchi Tiwari in some depth: https://freespeechcollective.in/censorship/the-limits-of-free-speech-caste-power-and-campus-democracy/
  16. CJP has come under quite a bit of criticism for not being able to understand the gender, caste, and religious complexities of youth in India and for lacking a strong ideological standpoint on various issues: https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/cockroach-janta-party-ideology/article71084800.ece
  17. Anirudh Kanisetti, in his recent public history work, has illuminated that Buddhism had already declined by the 11th century in favor of Brahmin settlements, well before the Turks came to North India.  https://theprint.in/opinion/how-buddhists-lost-out-to-brahmins-in-nalanda-even-before-the-turks-came/2149616/
  18. In his 1956 speech, Buddha or Karl Marx, Ambedkar contrasts the violent approaches of European revolutions (French and Russian) with the peaceful, democratic methods of Buddha’s approach to moral and social transformation.

 

  • Support Shuddhashar

    Support our independent work, help us to stay pay-wall free by becoming a patron today.

    Join Patreon

Subscribe to Shuddhashar FreeVoice to receive updates

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Subscribe to Shuddhashar FreeVoice to receive updates

শুদ্ধস্বর
error: Content is protected !!