The European Union has recently declared Bangladesh a “safe country.” This designation is likely one of the reasons Denmark rejected Murshida Aktar’s asylum application, an at-risk writer who has been living in Denmark under the auspices of ICORN (International Cities of Refuge Network) since 2021. This decision rests on an incomplete and flawed assessment of the political and societal conditions that gave rise to violence, persecution, and targeted killings in the first place.
Over the past 15 years under the Awami League, Bangladeshis from diverse backgrounds faced serious risk. This period saw sharp increases in enforced disappearances, extrajudicial “crossfire” killings, and brutal hacking murders, all carried out with impunity under the Awami League. Political affiliation has long shaped personal vulnerability in Bangladesh: BNP members are targeted under Awami League rule, and AL members are targeted under BNP rule. This cyclical political violence does not capture the complete or relevant picture here.
Threats against secular writers, activists, and progressives are not motivated by party politics and retribution. They stem from organized Islamist networks that operate primarily beyond formal political structures. It is well documented that the Awami League enabled violence against bloggers, secularists, and minorities by allowing radical Islamist actors to attack with impunity—seeking to avoid confrontation with hardline religious groups while simultaneously projecting the image that it was keeping Islamist power in check. However, when it comes to protecting individuals accused of criticizing religion, there is no meaningful distinction among the Awami League, BNP, or Jamaat-e-Islami. The interim government under Dr. Muhammad Yunus did not alter this situation either.
These Islamist networks remain active and influential. Under Dr. Yunus’ interim government, convicted radicals were released, and they remain free and active today. Prominent Islamists continue to publicly support violence against “atheists” and so-called blasphemers. In this recent election, Jamaat-e-Islami has expanded its parliamentary presence. Given this landscape, there is no credible indication that the risks faced by secular and outspoken individuals have diminished.
Although the ousting of an authoritarian regime in 2024 and an election in 2026 opened the door to political transition, it does not follow that Bangladesh has become safer. For one thing, elections were held only a month ago—far too soon to assess meaningful structural change. The July Charter—the post-uprising national referendum on constitutional reforms—does not adequately address pressing gender-related issues, and it did not include significant input from women. While the charter outlines a goal of increasing the percentage of women candidates in parliamentary nominations by at least 5%, gradually rising to 33%, all major parties failed this first test: fewer than 4% of candidates were women, and only 7 women secured seats in a 300-member parliament. This unwillingness to meet even a minimal benchmark for representation points to deeper systemic problems regarding women’s status in this new Bangladesh. Furthermore, the fate of the July Charter remains uncertain and unenforced. As of this writing, the BNP is reluctant to implement it.
At the same time, the situation for women has deteriorated significantly. Women’s participation in decision making has been largely erased, despite their prominent roles in the Uprising. Women seeking political office in this election were subjected to relentless abuse, threats, and public humiliation, forcing many to withdraw their candidacies. Gender-based violence surged in 2025, particularly in the lead-up to elections. Police data and rights organizations report increases in rape, harassment, and intimidation.
This rise in violence is closely linked to the growing influence of hardline religious groups. In 2025, thousands mobilized to protest women’s rights initiatives, framing gender equality as “anti-Islamic.” Religious leaders openly opposed women’s participation in public life, including sports, and issued threats against reform efforts. As a result, women and girls have faced horrific verbal, physical, and digital attacks.
These conditions create an especially dangerous environment for outspoken women. For individuals like Murshida Aktar—a woman, writer, and outspoken progressive feminist—the risks are compounded. She faces threats not only from political instability but also from social and religious hostility toward women who speak publicly, challenge societal norms, and live outside prescribed roles.
For those in exile, the risks are even greater. There is no evidence that Bangladesh has become safer for individuals targeted for their writing, beliefs, or advocacy for women’s or LGBTQ+ rights. No political party or state authority has made any credible commitment to protecting them.
Return, therefore, would not mean safety or restoration. Those who left Bangladesh under threat would be unable to return to their profession or way of life. For women, these risks are intensified by stigma and patriarchal norms. Those who have lived independently abroad, spoken publicly, or defied religious expectations face heightened scrutiny, isolation, harassment, and harm upon return. Not only are they cut off from professional opportunities, but they are also distanced from their community and even their family networks, leaving them even more exposed.
In this context, Murshida Aktar’s return would expose her to layered and intersecting forms of danger. The conditions that forced her to flee remain in place. In many ways, those conditions have worsened. Denmark, a country that gave this at-risk writer refuge for four years – during which time she wrote, published, and gave talks at local events – has a moral obligation to consider the full consequences of return. We urge the Danish government to reconsider its decision and allow Murshida Aktar to remain in the country.
