As the aspirations behind Bangladesh’s July uprising failed to materialize, Trans Bangladeshi citizens must rely on coalition-building efforts to make their voices heard.
In 2024, Bangladesh experienced a historic youth-led uprising that overthrew the Awami League party led by Sheikh Hasina. Fast forward to February 2026, where the country’s elections brought in another period of dynastic rule, this time helmed by the infamous Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). What could have been a tangible shift in Bangladesh’s political landscape was met with the lukewarm victory of the BNP, in which exhausted voters opted to return to a time when citizen participation was still intact. A large part of voter wariness can be attributed to the free-falling interim government led by Dr. Yunus, where everyday mob violence and atrocities against minorities, women, and children became commonplace. The only grace that can be extended to the interim government is that they entered into a realm of institutional wreckage left by years of plunder under the Awami League regime.
Another major development post-uprising has been the meteoric rise of the Jamaat-e-Islami party. The party had been away from public view for most of the 2000s, their popular view tainted by their role as collaborators of the Pakistani military during Bangladesh’s war for independence. With the Awami League banned from participating in the 2026 elections, Jamaat banded together with July activists, Islamists across various sects, and even 1971 liberation war figureheads to give the BNP a run for their electoral seats. Even though Bangladesh, as a democratic state, was conceived on liberal and secular terrains, Jamaat’s comeback into Bangladesh’s politics did not come as a surprise. Rather, their political maneuvers stem from decades of Islamist factions clamoring for power and the gradual shift toward Islamic modes of decorum in public spaces.
As Islamization geared into full throttle, transgender people, among other minorities, have faced significant roadblocks in articulating their demands for the newly constructed Bangladesh. While street demonstrations were a regular occurrence, no formidable group came forward to assert how the country can uphold the rights of trans people through a more formalized transgender bill. Instead, Islamist fronts across the nation were united in their declaration that transgender and ‘homosexual’ people have no place in the new Bangladesh.
Their experiences reveal a clear gap between the state’s promises of inclusion and the reality they face. As a result, large sections of the transgender population were unable to vote, revealing that voting was not about political disinterest, but also a result of structural barriers perpetrated by the ruling powers. Given that most trans persons do not possess documents that reflect who they are, they are structurally excluded from economic, social, and political life, which is exactly what Islamization forces are moving toward – denying citizenship, material access, and belonging to Bangladesh’s minorities.
What exactly occurred over these past eighteen months that fueled the rise of Bangladesh’s Islamists and its anti-trans proponents? More importantly, why did we not hand over governance to a transformative, youth-led political party but rather to the same old dynastic echelons of power? If one were to sum up the recent election results, Bangladesh did not flip the switch on its political system. It restored the version that used to work before the Awami League hijacked democracy. And this very same version has been working behind the scenes to Islamize Bangladesh’s politics since the country’s inception.
The Rise of Islamist Politics in Bangladesh
The 1971 liberation war brought Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to power as the country’s charismatic leader, who instilled socialism and secularism in Bangladesh’s 1972 constitution. But he started the Islamization process by building strong ties with the Muslim world and joining the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting in 1974. The Islamization process continued after Mujib’s assassination in 1975 when Ziaur Rahman ascended to power and formed the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). He lifted the ban on Islamist politics and allowed all Islamist parties to join the government, while discarding secularism and socialism from the constitution. Although his tenure was credited with having a balanced foreign policy, notable investments from oil-rich Middle Eastern nations flourished, establishing Bangladesh as one of the largest Muslim countries.
After Ziaur Rahman’s murder in 1981, a military officer named Hussain Ershad gained military control and incorporated Islam as the state religion in the constitution. His rule ended with a mass uprising, after which the BNP assumed state power, this time under Khaleda Zia. The growing turn toward Islamization led to the emergence of the Jamaat-e-Islami, which won 17 seats in the 2001 elections and drew criticism as they are claimed to have partnered with the Pakistani military to carry out war crimes during Bangladesh’s liberation war.
Once Sheikh Hasina came to power and ruled for 16 years, she did not oppose Islam as the state religion but reinstated secularism within the constitution through a 2011 amendment. In her quest to exact revenge on her father, Mujib’s assassination, Hasina charged top Jamaat leaders with crimes against humanity committed during the 1971 war. While Hasina formed guardrails around the Jamaat’s Islamization efforts, she held friendly relations with Hefazat-e-Islam, an Islamist outfit formed by Qawmi madrasa-based members, who were strong in numbers and could influence the outcome of elections. Hasina harbored an anti-Islamist public image but continued to rub shoulders with Islamists to cement her electoral victories.
After Hasina’s ouster in 2024, the interim government withdrew all court cases against Jamaat members and lifted the ban on their political activity, allowing Jamaat to reignite Islamist politics in Bangladesh once again. While Jamaat worked diligently in the background to capture votes, the interim government’s ignorance of everyday citizens’ struggles created a vacuum for Islamists, namely in their deployment of mob-based rule to attain specific demands.
Decoding Jamaat’s performance
“We have reached a decision about a one-point demand: to ensure the safety of human life and establish justice in society. The demand is the downfall of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The fascist government must be abolished. We want to form a Bangladesh, create a political environment that would never allow another autocracy and fascism,” – Nahid Islam on August 3, 2024.
Nahid Islam is one of the convenors of the new political party, the National Citizen Party (NCP), a group that ran on the promise of bringing in a new generation that could redefine the country’s political future. Born from the energy of student activism and the aspiration for systemic reform, the party promised to challenge the entrenched dominance of dynastic politics. It agitated for a new constitutional order and a break from the patronage networks that have long consumed Bangladesh’s political landscape.
However, the Jamaat managed to absorb leaders such as the NCP’s Nahid Islam, among others, the same heroes of the uprising who had helped topple Hasina’s government. One reason behind this is that the NCP lacked a clear organizational infrastructure that could penetrate deep into villages and small towns where electoral battles are ultimately decided. In contrast, Jamaat had extensive networks in rural and semi-urban areas, which NCP sought to leverage strategically. When the coalition formation was announced in 2025, the NCP, which had initially marketed itself as a clean break from the past, lost credibility as a new political force. Additionally, the interim government under Dr. Yunus stepped aside time and again to ensure that the voices behind the Jamaat-NCP alliance were heard clearly.
With Jamaat’s geographic concentration in rural pockets and NCP’s youth base, Jamaat performed strongest in the northwest and southwest regions of Bangladesh, which have been neglected for decades by economic stagnation and by those who supported child marriage. While Jamaat may have conceded defeat, its ability to win 68 seats in a 300-seat parliament paints a darker picture, particularly for minoritized queer and trans populations living in economically battered areas where Jamaat captured the majority of votes.
A Global Push against Trans Rights
Anti-trans protests in Bangladesh have been gaining momentum since January 2024. The first incitement arose from strong opposition by Islamist forces over a social science textbook that narrated the story of how Sharif transitioned into a trans woman named Sharifa. The book was publicly torn apart by anti-trans Islamist academic Asif Mahtab, who alleged that the story ‘normalized homosexuality.’ Even though Hasina had declared war on Islamist politics, she turned a blind eye toward the anti-trans demonstrations, which opposed the passage of any transgender bill.
The central argument crafted by anti-trans Islamists is the deliberate moral and ideological linking of homosexuality with transgender identities. These linkages have been drawn to reference the Qur’anic story of Hazrat Lut, who is professed to have succumbed to his homosexual desires. Religious scholars across the world have disqualified such interpretations of Lut’s story and have stated that the Quran says that the men of Sodom wanted to have sex with the visiting angels by force, which is an example of sexual assault and not of sexual desire.
However, the story of Lut has been manipulated by male-dominated Islamist factions for political gain and to punish transgender individuals living in Muslim countries. Flattening trans people’s layered experiences in combating rigid gender binaries and, therefore, biometric state surveillance, has been reduced to sexual ravagery. These tactics in Bangladesh cannot be isolated from the globally circulating eruption of anti-trans ideologies that have subsumed American and European politics alike, thus ensuring that anti-transness does not stem solely from religion but specifically from Bangladesh’s Islamist political posturing and geopolitical anti-trans assimilation.
Trans people were especially hopeful after the fall of Hasina’s regime and thought that the energetic Gen-Z youth would be able to overcome the Islamists’ rallying anti-trans propaganda. The weeks following the uprising opened up possibilities for ideating a Bangladesh that may be inclusive of various overlooked communities, including transgender persons. The uprising belonged to trans people as much as it did to every other Bangladeshi citizen.
However, the rapid tilt toward Islamist-fueled mob rule led to unfavorable developments, with some trans individuals stating their fear of identifying with the word ‘transgender.’ Trans writer Sahara Chowdhury’s expulsion from Sylhet’s Metropolitan University and her subsequent hunger strike during August-October 2025 also instigated mass Islamist demonstrations, where protesters pontificated that ‘transgenderism’ and ‘homosexuality’ are not part of Bangladesh’s Islamic values.
The electoral period also saw Anwara Islam Rani, a trans woman, run as an independent candidate for the Rangpur-3 constituency. Days before the February 12 election, Rani withdrew her candidacy citing undisclosed reasons. In a press conference, she highlighted the need for political parties to provide protection for vulnerable communities and end the ongoing discrimination against transgender citizens. Whether Rani’s withdrawal from the final stages of the campaign race was motivated by threats against her identity and livelihood cannot be corroborated at this time.
Trans aspirations at the polls and a return to ‘normalcy’
A preliminary survey of LGBTQIA+, hijra, and gender-diverse people in Bangladesh that was conducted by the Center for Diversity Studies Asia showed that many voters approached the national elections more from a survival standpoint rather than exercising meaningful political choices. Participants’ main demands include ‘ensuring personal safety, preventing state repression and mob violence, guaranteeing the right to live, and allowing people to live freely.’ The survey found that participants did not expect significant positive changes during the next government’s tenure but expressed hope that the ongoing provisions would remain ‘the way they are.’
The survey revealed an underlying fatigue in the trans community’s lackluster demands for rights and broader citizenship, a fatigue that Bangladesh’s growing right-wing Islamization has strategically lodged across all minority-led movements, NGOs, hijra gharanas, political representation, and affirmative legal action. Take, for example, this survey, where the trans population, in particular, expressed deep frustration and distrust regarding the voting process, especially with mismatched names and gender markers on their National Identity (NID) cards that would open them up to harassment at the polling centers.
Their experiences reveal a clear gap between the state’s promises of inclusion and the reality they face. As a result, large sections of the transgender population were unable to vote, revealing that voting was not about political disinterest, but also a result of structural barriers perpetrated by the ruling powers. Given that most trans persons do not possess documents that reflect who they are, they are structurally excluded from economic, social, and political life, which is exactly what Islamization forces are moving toward – denying citizenship, material access, and belonging to Bangladesh’s minorities.
Another critical argument to draw out is that the word ‘transgender person’ has no place in Bangladesh’s current legislative framework, especially in the absence of a transgender bill. As no school or place of employment wants to take in transgender individuals, the only recourse for young transfeminine individuals is to enter a hijra ‘gharana’ (influential house). There are no barriers to entry into a gharana, as one has to pay a certain amount of money to the ‘guru’ who runs it. This payment of money is in return for her protection and to become bonded labor within this house of transfeminine individuals. The gharanas are a deeply violent and hierarchical community. The gharana network’s proliferation and its funneling of trans people into sex work operate simultaneously alongside Bangladesh’s Islamist state and ultimately, the global clampdown on trans rights.
The Way Forward
A neutral observer may well conclude that the aspirations behind Bangladesh’s uprising have not been materialized. The mass was never meaningfully involved in its political transformation. No significant leap was taken by any existing political party to disrupt entrenched social and legal hierarchies governing present-day Bangladesh. The Jamaat’s comeback, especially in its ties to child marriage, is deeply worrisome, given how LGBTQ youth are forcibly being married off. Their goal is to redefine Bangladeshi identity in their own exclusionary image by creating a theocracy.
But the problem with Jamaat and the rise of Islamist politics did not stop at the ballot box, as they are gearing up to challenge the parliament through intimidation tactics. What the Jamaat will do in the coming months and years will have profound implications for the direction of Bangladesh’s electoral politics, particularly for any revival of the country’s trans movement. With no sign of a revamped transgender bill reaching the BNP’s parliamentary halls, it is incumbent on all minorities and feminist groups to work together to create alternative conditions of care and resilience. Ultimately, the success or failure of these coalition-building efforts could make or break how trans Bangladeshi citizens will navigate the heightened Islamist state.
