A civil-society-led government like the interim one could never have provided a lasting solution to the challenges Bangladesh faces, nor could it have fully controlled the turbulent situation. Bangladesh’s problems must be solved politically—through political parties and a political society.
On August 5, 2024, the autocratic regime of Sheikh Hasina, which had spanned over a decade and a half, collapsed through a horizontal, spontaneous, and inclusive mass uprising. For the following three days, Bangladesh existed in a virtually stateless condition without a functional government. Given the bloody backdrop, where state forces massacred nearly a thousand citizens, there were fears of a severe and violent backlash.
However, during those three days, the protesters themselves stepped up in various ways to manage the situation. While the public’s immediate wrath and resentment fell upon the police (which was then in a state of total disarray), we also witnessed a remarkable display of social solidarity aimed at maintaining law and order. Finally, on August 8, an interim government was formed with Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus as its Chief Adviser.
Most of those in the interim government were from NGOs and civil society, along with two (later three) frontline student leaders of the movement. For better or worse, this government remained in power for eighteen months. The criteria for evaluating their success or failure should be distinct from those of any political government or of a government elected by ballot. They took charge during an ‘abnormal’ period, or what could be called a democratic transitional period. Their tenure was essentially the bridge between the fall of one government through a mass uprising and the arrival of another through elections. While there may be varying opinions regarding the duration of this period, this was, in broad terms, the framework of their mandate.
Although there was much discussion about reform, the initiative, courage, or even the means to reform the bureaucracy were absent. A civil-society-led government like the interim one could never have provided a lasting solution to Bangladesh’s problems, nor could it have controlled the situation entirely. It is best to accept the truth that Bangladesh’s problems must be solved politically—through political parties and a political society.
However, given the manner in which the uprising unfolded in Bangladesh and the wave of dreams it ignited, it was difficult to accept that it was merely for a change of government through an ‘election.’ There was a profound and widespread sentiment that so much blood was surely not shed just to replace one party with another. Over the last decade, during the autocratic, or in popular parlance ‘fascist’, regime of the Awami League, the activism that gradually gained momentum had a core message: we no longer want just the departure of Hasina, but rather the abolition of the very system that produces a ‘Hasina’.
A primary theme of this activism was the critique of various anti-democratic provisions in Bangladesh’s Constitution. In particular, the extreme concentration of power in the office of the Prime Minister was a major target. The goal was to establish a system that balances the powers of various state institutions by reducing the Prime Minister’s powers, ensuring that an ‘individual’ cannot easily become an autocrat.
To put it simply and briefly, this was the dominant voice and spirit of activism at the time. When the call for a ‘new settlement’ to replace the ‘old settlement’ arose during the uprising, it pointed toward this kind of systemic change. Consequently, state reform and constitutional reform became the central themes following the uprising. I mention this because the question of reform emerged so powerfully from the state’s institutional and political failures over the past fifty years and the activism that grew in response to them.
When the interim government took office, it essentially committed to three primary tasks: reform, justice, and elections. Following this, debates began to unfold. Those who were confident of an immediate victory in the polls demanded a quick election; others insisted that elections should be held only after justice and necessary reforms are completed. This was a period marked by suspicion and mistrust. On one hand, the absence of a complete roadmap, coupled with Bangladesh’s past experiences, created a growing atmosphere of doubt regarding whether an election would be held at all as time passed.
The three major promises made by the interim government can now be evaluated. First is the question of reform. The strategy adopted by the interim government regarding reform is worthy of praise. By forming 11 reform commissions, each submitted its report based on expert opinions, political and social groups, and various stakeholders. Among these, a political Consensus Commission was initiated involving six of the key sectors. An effort was made to reach a consensus on various issues, including the Constitution, by involving approximately 30 to 31 political parties, excluding the fallen autocratic party. This consensus eventually led to the creation of the ‘July Charter’.
This act of consensus is, in itself, a significant event in the political history of Bangladesh. An overview of Bangladesh’s political history reveals that political factions (or, rather, the political elites) have repeatedly failed during political crises. They could never resolve a crisis through mutual dialogue or negotiations—a failure that previously led to the intervention of the ‘military’ during the ‘One/Eleven’ government.
Historically, the initiative to bring them to the table was usually taken by foreign ambassadors. The significance of this Consensus Commission becomes clear when one considers how, after the 1990s, foreign diplomats had to intervene at every political turning point to get the parties to sit together. Perhaps for the first time, political parties in Bangladesh are debating and deciding collectively on the type of reforms needed and attempting to reach a common understanding. In this regard, one of the primary successes of the interim government is initiating such a process and presenting a set of minimum consensus proposals.
Even if it had wanted to, the interim government could not have done much beyond presenting these types of proposals (in the form of the July Charter) and ordinances. Ultimately, these reforms must be implemented through an election and the National Parliament; it is not possible to execute them properly by bypassing the electoral process. Therefore, the interim government’s major success lay in presenting a set of minimum reform proposals through various channels before the election and creating the conditions necessary for their implementation.
In the end, the responsibility for implementation falls into the hands of the elected government. The ongoing friction regarding the ‘Note of Dissent’ in the July National Charter between the BNP and the NCP (and others) actually indicates the intended nature of the change. The BNP is less interested in structural reforms, preferring to maintain the executive branch’s power distribution as it is, while the NCP and others favor radical reforms.
Generally, in Bangladesh’s political landscape, the two major parties are the BNP and the Awami League. In the absence of the Awami League, everyone knew that the BNP was the largest force. Consequently, in political compromises or negotiations, as one side became relatively more powerful, the entire negotiation tilted toward the BNP. This tilt becomes evident when judging the ‘historical’ part of the July Charter and the July Proclamation.
Now, to what extent will these reforms be realized after the election depends on the elected government. It remains to be seen how much the elected government—the BNP—will honor this political consensus and these aspirations. If they attempt to break the political compromise as in the past, the political landscape of Bangladesh will once again turn violent, or at least such a possibility will arise. Next is the discussion regarding the election. After the first six months of the interim period, rumors grew strong in political circles that the government was unwilling to hold elections. Although the government repeatedly spoke of elections, the failure to present a clear roadmap and whispers about the ambitions of certain quarters within the administration created an atmosphere of uncertainty.
During this time, news of Dr. Yunus’s potential resignation further complicated the situation. However, the election finally took place on February 12. The interim government deserves credit for organizing one of the most peaceful elections in Bangladesh’s history. Despite the many rumors that had spread, they succeeded in delivering an excellent election.
From the very beginning, the trial of the Awami League was the most ‘burning issue.’ Mohammad Tajul Islam was appointed as the Chief Prosecutor of the International Crimes Tribunal. While Mohammad Tajul Islam is an experienced individual, his association with a specific political party and his role on the opposing side during the 2013 war crimes trials caused the tribunal to take on a political appearance from the outset. Many commented at the time that such a political complexion in sensitive cases could be harmful in the long run. Nevertheless, the interim government succeeded in delivering a verdict against Sheikh Hasina for crimes against humanity. This is a significant success.
However, it must be remembered that most of the masterminds and key perpetrators behind the state-led and party-led massacre in July and August fled the country after the 5th of August. Some have suggested that this occurred under the army’s shelter. This has created another layer of complexity for justice: even though verdicts have been delivered against most of the main accused, they cannot be brought to face their sentences. Furthermore, we have seen serious allegations raised against several prosecutors of the tribunal. In such a sensitive tribunal, such allegations provide an opportunity to question the entire judicial process in the long term, reminiscent of our experiences from 2013.
Alongside this, another grave trend emerged regarding justice: the filing of one fabricated case after another. Murder cases were filed even against writers and journalists, and many remain in prison due to these false charges. Such fabricated cases undermine public confidence in genuine cases, fostering the perception that these legal actions are politically motivated. However, the use of the Anti-Terrorism Act remains the most harmful trend to date. This occurred during the League’s regime and continued during the interim period; even the Bangladesh Chhatra League was banned using this law. Consequently, the interim government’s stance on the issue of justice appears mixed. This is both a failure of the interim government and a continuation of the long-standing culture prevalent in our judicial system.
Beyond these three promises, two other sectors remained constantly on the discussion table during the interim period. First, the law-and-order situation during the interim tenure was largely in disarray. The fragile situation created by police inaction, especially at the outset, had widespread repercussions. Various far-right groups became active. Over the past year and a half, we witnessed the sequential destruction of shrines (mazars), incidents of mob lynching, and even cases where bodies were set on fire.
About six months after the uprising, Dhanmondi 32 was demolished, followed by a period where various structures were systematically torn down. In December 2025, the offices of Prothom Alo and The Daily Star were set on fire, nearly resulting in the death of journalists. Attacks were also carried out on Chhayanaut Shongshkriti-Bhobon and Udichi. One of Bangladesh’s leading journalists alleged that a section of the government was complicit in these attacks.
For the entire eighteen months, the interim government failed to take any effective action against such activities beyond issuing mere statements. On the contrary, far-right groups gained strength in various ways over this period. This entire phenomenon is now being identified as ‘mob violence.’ The word ‘mob’ has never been so prevalent in Bangladesh’s political discourse before.
Secondly, just before the election, the interim government signed an agreement with the United States titled the ‘Agreement on Reciprocal Trade.’ As soon as the agreement was published on a US website, a storm of controversy erupted. Although stakeholders in the interim government have been trying to manufacture consent for this deal, it has faced criticism from almost all sections of civil society. The Research Director of CPD expressed being ‘stunned and shocked’ by the terms of the agreement. Discomfort regarding this deal was also evident in the remarks of several interim advisors. Asif Nazrul went so far as to say he was unaware of the specifics of the agreement, while Farida Akhter later mentioned her attempts to block it.
The interim government later claimed they had consulted with BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami before signing. To date, neither the government nor the opposition in parliament has commented on this agreement, leading to the assumption that there is consensus between them on this matter. The rumors that persisted for a year and a half about the interim government being pro-US seemed to find validation in this agreement and the surprising appointment of interim advisor Khalilur Rahman as the Foreign Minister of the subsequent BNP government.
As I stated earlier, it would neither be appropriate nor logical to review the interim government in the same light as five or six normal administrations. My observation becomes clearer if one simply recalls their helpless state in the face of bureaucratic influence. Many advisors admitted that much of the work was stalled by bureaucracy. Recognizing the transient nature of the interim setup and its lack of long-term political authority, the bureaucracy often exhibited a profound lack of responsiveness, effectively stalling many initiatives.
Although there was much discussion about reform, the initiative, courage, or even the means to reform the bureaucracy were absent. A civil-society-led government like the interim one could never have provided a lasting solution to Bangladesh’s problems, nor could it have controlled the situation entirely. It is best to accept the truth that Bangladesh’s problems must be solved politically—through political parties and a political society.
Consequently, their scope of work was limited. By creating a process for political consensus, establishing the conditions for reform, and successfully organizing a peaceful and fair election, I believe the interim government succeeded in its two primary tasks. Just as implementing reforms is a long-term process, so too is justice. Nonetheless, they were able to deliver the verdict against Sheikh Hasina. On the other hand, managing the violent trends that emerged during the interim period remains a major challenge.
At this moment, expanding the space for dialogue regarding the US agreement and other issues is essential. It is urgent to strengthen the discourse on reform and to raise it more loudly and systematically within social and political circles. Several reform reports were produced during the interim tenure; we must now initiate discussions in the civic sphere on how to implement them and exert pressure on the current government to do so.
