The state surveillance of both refugees arriving in Greece and the journalists covering their stories obscures the Greek states dehumanisation of the refugees, reducing their plight to security statistics rather than genuine humanitarian concerns.
Since 2015, amid the Greek refugee crisis’s global spotlight, Greece has drastically expanded its surveillance tactics, significantly impacting asylum seekers and journalists. These measures do not merely affect those directly targeted but also contribute to the broader narratives of migration, security, governance and the resurfacing of the far-right within the region. The island of Lesvos exemplifies the on-ground reality of these practices, where stringent state control over information dissemination has clouded transparency and stifled accurate reporting on migrant conditions and human rights issues.
Monitoring of forced migrants
The Greek government’s comprehensive surveillance apparatus is intricately designed to conceal the harsh realities within refugee camps and deter humanitarian interventions. Since March 2016, when the EU–Turkey deal was implemented, the process of monitoring and surveilling asylum seekers has become a more prominent factor in the management of forced migration in Lesvos. Since March 20, 2016, all asylum seekers arriving on the island have been subjected to ‘geographical restrictions’. These restrictions generally applied to all applicants, requiring them to stay in the refugee camps, which at the time were referred to as ‘Reception and Identifications Centres (RICs)’.
The requirements disregarded any vulnerabilities or individual needs, and applicants would rarely be able to voice their needs or access the resources (e.g. legal aid) necessary to have their needs considered. The result was, for many years, overcrowded camps, especially in times of large numbers of arrivals. In turn, this resulted in undignified conditions, with a large number of asylum seekers living without access to adequate infrastructure, accommodation, security, water, food or medical care.
The trend continued when Greece imposed a new asylum law — the International Protection Act (IPA) — in January 2020, imposing new restrictions on the freedom of movement for asylum seekers. Supported by EU funding, the result was, for all senses and purposes, detention, and all new arrivals were automatically subject to ‘restrictions of liberty’.
After the devastating fire of the Moria camp on Lesvos in 2020, the EU, through the European Commission, supported Greece with €276 million to fund five ‘multi-purpose’ centres on the Greek islands, combining receptions and pre-return detentions. This facilitated the establishment of Closed-Controlled Access Centres (CCACs) throughout Greece. These centres, replacing the earlier ‘Hotspot approach’, or RICs, are symptomatic of the national security agenda. Whilst the CCAC on other Greek islands is located relatively close, 6–25km from capital city centres, the Vastria camp on Lesvos is in the middle of a dense forest 30 km from the capital, Mytilini, situated right next to a garbage dump. When exactly the Vastria camps open remains uncertain due to legal and humanitarian concerns. In 2021, extensive surveillance infrastructure was planned across all 39 camps in Greece, incorporating state-of-the-art technologies such as X-ray machines, drone patrols, and thermal imaging at checkpoints.
This controlled dissemination of information allows the Greek government to maintain a strategic narrative, managing public perception by keeping criticism at bay while sustaining a narrative of control through the unknown. The less the public knows about camp realities, the more the government can manipulate perception and rationalise its heavy-handed approaches. This aligns with broader tactics to obscure the severe conditions and hardship faced by asylum seekers, thereby dehumanising them and reducing their plight to security statistics rather than genuine humanitarian concerns.
These restrictions on movement, monitoring, and surveillance are part of the Greek surveillance apparatus. Such enforcement measures effectively portray asylum seekers as security risks, eroding public empathy and framing their plight within a national security context rather than a humanitarian framework. This way, the Greek state controls the narrative. When camps are located in remote regions, asylum seekers are socially excluded, further underpinning these narratives of asylum seekers as security threats rather than people in need.
A crucial aspect of the Greek state’s strategy involves controlling information flow, thereby obstructing free journalism and genuine humanitarian action. A humanitarian volunteer I spoke with for my research in 2019 recounted incidents where Greek police have confiscated cameras and erased footage around camps to prevent unfavourable media exposure. The Greek government has institutionalised these practices under the General Operation Regulation enacted in November 2020, ensuring tight regulation of discourse on camp conditions and effectively silencing firsthand accounts from humanitarian workers or government employees.
In addition to this regulatory environment, the 2019 arrest of Salam Aldeen, a prominent NGO leader and a vocal critic of camp atrocities, exemplifies Greece’s broader punitive measures against dissent. Many in the humanitarian community viewed his arrest as a deliberate move to silence voices documenting and exposing state misconduct. Salam’s arrest thus served as a cautionary tale for other humanitarian actors who considered recording or sharing their observations about state actions, instilling a sense of deterrence among aid workers eager to speak out on human rights abuses.
Another way the Greek government applies information control is by staging meticulously curated presentations during official visits. In my research on the violent inaction by the Greek state and Moria as a site of struggle, humanitarian volunteers reported that when dignitaries visit camps such as Moria, these visits are highly orchestrated. Camps would undergo superficial cleanings, a number of camp residents would be temporarily relocated, and journalists would be restricted from genuine access, ensuring a sanitised view of the facilities. When the Greek state would arrange official media tours, the visits would be equally arranged. As articulated by a volunteer in 2019:
They don’t want to keep the camp so bad so that Greece’s reputation is completely ruined. When Angelina Jolie and the pope visited, they cleaned up the camp a little bit. Journalists are not let in. They don’t want to show the worst part of the camp, but they want to make sure it’s bad enough not to want to come.
In a visit to Lesvos on election day in 2023, the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis praised himself for keeping his promise to the local community, enforcing a ‘tough but fair policy on the migration issue’. Mitsotakis’ self-praise shows how he remains supportive of the illegal and violent ways in which the Greek state has been managing migration.
These migration management policies and Mitsotakis’ continual denial demonstrate the Greek state’s efforts to manage international perception while maintaining domestic deterrence messages. In doing so, official communication becomes a delicate balancing act, projecting deterrence to migrants while evading international criticism for humanitarian failures.
This controlled dissemination of information allows the Greek government to maintain a strategic narrative, managing public perception by keeping criticism at bay while sustaining a narrative of control through the unknown. The less the public knows about camp realities, the more the government can manipulate perception and rationalise its heavy-handed approaches. This aligns with broader tactics to obscure the severe conditions and hardship faced by asylum seekers, thereby dehumanising them and reducing their plight to security statistics rather than genuine humanitarian concerns.
The policy of legislative silence under regulations such as the General Operation Regulation facilitates an environment where suffering remains unseen. Asylum seekers’ experiences and rights violations, hidden behind literal and metaphorical barriers, become easily ignored. When suffering is unseen and undocumented, it is detached from public consciousness, enabling the state to present asylum seekers as threats needing control rather than individuals deserving of empathy and support.
Surveillance of Journalists and Politicians
Asylum seekers are not alone in being subject to far-reaching monitoring and surveillance. Journalists and politicians have also been subject to surveillance by the Greek state. The beginning of what is referred to as the Greek Watergate, in 2021, reports from Citizen Lab indicated that investigative journalist Thanasis Koukakis was subjected to ten-week surveillance with Predator spyware, raising further concerns over Greece’s surveillance practices.
The same year, Stravos Malichudis, an investigating journalist covering migration, was reportedly also targeted with spyware. In the following year, the Greek wiretapping scandal exposed government overreach and control tactics. The scandal revealed the Greek Government’s authorisation and possible execution of extensive surveillance, employing Predator spyware to target journalists and political opponents, including Socialist leader Nikos Androulakis.
The revelations, initially met with firm denials from the Greek government, highlighted illegal surveillance activities and fuelled scepticism about governmental transparency. The scandal expanded with Greek media reports listing high-profile individuals potentially subjected to state monitoring, challenging government denials and revealing broader implications of state misconduct.
Despite governmental refutations concerning Predator’s deployment, reports emerged of Greece allowing the spyware’s export through Intellexa, a spyware company, intensifying the complexity and reach of state surveillance. The situation exposed systemic issues within national intelligence operations, conflating claims of legal spyware use under Predator with broader, potentially unlawful activities — signalling systemic government overreach.
The crisis intensified further later that year when investigative journalist Tasos Telloglou, who was indeed investigating the use of spyware in Greece, also found himself under state surveillance. The resulting public outcry prompted the Greek government to propose restricting spyware sales. Yet paradoxically, legislation passed in December 2022 effectively legalised surveillance technologies’ procurement, enabling continued potential for misuse and failing to provide robust citizen protections.
Against such a backdrop, in 2022, the European Committee formed a Pegasus (PEGA) committee to emphasise a persistent EU struggle with spyware-induced rights infringements, advocating for urgent member state reforms, including Greece. The committee’s conclusions underscore the necessity for fortified European legal frameworks, pressing for transparency to protect against technological abuses — positioning Greece as a central focus needing reform in safeguarding democratic integrity.
On July 30 this year, the Greek Supreme Court ruled that it did not find any involvement with the spy software Predator or any other similar software by a state agency, namely the National Intelligence Service (EYP), the Anti-Terrorist Unit (DAEEB) and more generally the Ministry of Citizens Protection or any government official”. This effectively cleared the Greek government, essentially Kyriakos Mitsotakis’s office, of all charges. Limiting oversight, the ruling garnered widespread criticism from legal experts and opposition parties for undermining public trust and surveillance scrutiny.
Far-right influence in Europe
The Greek government’s expansive surveillance tactics and information control are not only reflective of national policy but also indicative of a broader trend across Europe where far-right movements gain ground. As the political climate shifts toward nationalistic agendas, the erosion of empathy towards asylum seekers is mirrored in other countries facing similar challenges. In this context, the rise of far-right parties reveals a concerning narrative, where legal and social frameworks are manipulated to instill fear and normalise discrimination against marginalized communities.
Beyond Greece, Europe is experiencing a notable revival of far-right influences, a trend that poses a significant threat to the democratic integrity of the Union. Political landscapes in key EU nations such as France and Germany starkly highlight this shift. In France, the National Rally led by Marine Le Pen has seen a dramatic increase in support, eclipsing centrist factions like Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance party in the latest European Parliament elections. The prospect of far-right governance looms large in France, with policies that frequently focus on rigorous immigration controls and a nationalistic agenda that jeopardises the EU’s internal cohesion and its progressive values.
Germany likewise faces similar pressures. The rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a far-right party, is gaining considerable traction, especially among younger voters and those in eastern regions who are disappointed with the existing political framework. While traditional parties still hold sway in EU institutions, the growing resonance of far-right ideologies points to a shifting political status quo across the continent. This trend raises alarms about nationalistic and populist sentiments that could gain even more momentum, echoing political trajectories seen in the U.S., such as a potential revival of Trump-era policies that encourage similar movements in Europe.
Nonetheless, the outlook is not entirely dire. The European People’s Party (EPP), along with other centrist and progressive groups, continues to exert considerable influence within EU frameworks, working diligently to stabilise the political environment and counteract the extremes of nationalism. In Eastern Europe, countries like Hungary and Poland, previously strongholds of right-wing populism, are seeing fractures in long-standing political dominance and revitalised democratic movements that challenge deep-seated power structures. Hungary, even with Viktor Orban at the helm, is witnessing the emergence of new political factions that advocate for a return to pro-European and democratic values.
The recent elections in Poland reflect this shifting political landscape as well, with opposition coalitions gaining momentum against the long-standing Law and Justice Party (PiS). These electoral dynamics highlight a growing resistance against far-right entrenchment, reaffirming the resilience of democratic institutions amid escalating challenges.
For now, there are no indications that the surge of right-wing political parties in Europe will affect state membership in the important transnational institutions — the EU, NATO and the European parliament. Right-wing parties might want to change the politics within the institutions, but most voters are too supportive of these institutions for even the far-right parties to suggest leaving. The broader European context illustrates the essential role of elections as mechanisms for upholding democratic checks, creating opportunities to shift political power away from illiberal forces. History shows that even in areas susceptible to authoritarian influences, robust democratic processes are vital for ensuring accountability and fostering civic engagement and political reform.
Nevertheless, far-right parties pose significant challenges. Across Europe, rising nationalist rhetoric threatens to undermine democratic cohesion, as exemplified here by Greece’s own far-right movements impact societal attitudes towards the freedom of the press and refugees. There is, however, cause for optimism as centrist and progressive factions remain active, aiming to stabilise the political dynamics weakened by the far-right.
Greek authorities have long neglected far-right violence, which has emboldened extremist groups to act with relative impunity. Now, far-right anti-democratic tactics are arguably also on the rise in Greece. While some institutional collaborations have emerged, like those between the police and NGOs tracking hate crimes, a comprehensive strategy to address these threats remains overdue.
Evaluating Greece’s struggle against far-right use of undemocratic means and outright violence reveals both the complexities of extremism and the urgent need for authorities to develop effective, coordinated responses to combat it and protect the most vulnerable in society. The interplay of political dynamics, public perception, and rising far-right sentiments within Greece echoes a crucial message: Europe must confront these challenges collectively to safeguard its democratic values and uphold human rights for all.
