Post-elections, Bangladesh must find a way to deal with its rejuvenated illiberal forces without infringing on democratic rights and by delivering on promises.
The long journey from an autocracy to a rejuvenated democratic Bangladesh ended in March with a short, hectic election campaign and a resounding victory for the BNP. All this is good. The looming shadow is the one-third of the votes for the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami, which made it the largest opposition party in parliament and the second-largest party in the country. A major question before the government and friends of democracy is how to deal with this elephant in the room, the presence of a resurgent illiberal force. Looking at the Bangladesh situation from the tucked-away corners of social-democratic Scandinavia, this is perhaps the main question. In a democracy, do the illiberal have a right to voice? And if they do, how to deal with them? The first step is to understand exactly what the Islamism behind Jamaat looks like.
The Illiberals in the Election
The February 2026 election was truly a remarkable event, even in the annals of turbulent Bangladeshi politics. The year and a half that had passed since the autocratic Awami League rulers were ousted was a time of uncertainty and endless debate. The old rulers were excluded, and the country remained restless for a long while. There was also uncertainty and disagreement over reforming the constitution. And the final decision to set the date for a fully democratic election was slow in coming.
But then the country ignited in a short and hectic election campaign that ended in a peaceful poll and a generally accepted result. Turnout was not great, but in the context of the boycott called by the ousted Sheikh Hasina, sixty per cent must be considered a popular mandate. Half of those who voted voted for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party BNP, which gave it a huge majority in parliament. A new and democratic Bangladesh had seen the light of day. Gestation had been hard, but once it was there, it was applauded from almost all corners, and a sigh of relief was audible all around. It was a happy outcome. Or at least so it still seems, only weeks after the election when this piece is being written.
It is, however, important to keep in mind that what fuels Jamaat’s support is not just a desire to create an Islamic state based on eighth-century Arab jurisprudence, but also to see development, sincere rulers, an end to corruption, and roads that do not crumble after the first monsoon. Bangladesh has suffered years of neglect, and self-serving rulers and voters are looking for alternatives. Some feel the answer is in BNP, but others are sceptical and have voted for an ideologically driven Jamaat.
From a Nordic perspective, the first-past-the-post system is problematic. Rather than a parliament reflecting voters’ diverse ideological or other interests, as in a proportional representation system, Bangladesh uses the British system, in which the candidate with the most votes wins. In a two-contender situation, this makes sense. In a situation with many different contenders, say, the vote is split between four or five parties, the winner is often supported by only 30% of the voters or even less. The first-past-the-post system tends to produce parliamentary majorities from electoral minorities. With half the votes, the BNP won more than two-thirds of the seats.
The runner-up, Jamaat, with about one-fifth of the seats, is the main opposition. But in the first-past-the-post system, one-fifth of the seats do not accurately reflect the support of close to one-third of the voters. One third was a surprise. Because of Bangladesh’s relative homogeneity, the vote for Jamaat is spread across the entire country. The one-fifth in parliament does not precisely reflect the political significance of the support.
A proportional representation system would have given Jamaat even more seats, and BNP fewer. But other parties would also have had a chance, such as the many smaller leftists parties, other ideologies, regional parties or narrow interest parties – which in the FPTP system rarely get seats at all. Over time, the PR system produces more variety in party support and reflect better a variety of interests.
What kind of Islamists?
The question is what kind of opposition and political force Jamaat wants to be and can be. The party’s anti-liberation position in 1971 makes it a much-despised, even hated force among many in the country, especially progressives and nationalists, but also well beyond. The currently ruling BNP was always less antagonistic toward Jamaat than its main rival, the Awami League, or progressive leftist forces, but even the BNP was never really warm toward it.
Historically, BNP has been a part of the centre-right, nationalist camp and has been less inclined towards the mighty neighbour India than Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League. But on the whole, at least as far as values are concerned, BNP represented a fairly liberal, broad, middle-of-the-road set of values. Intellectuals berated the party for its collaboration with Jamaat, but the general BNP workers, activists, and the party’s student wing, Chhatra Dal, were never very enthusiastic about it either. They opposed Jamaatis – the adherents of Jamaat and the activists of the Jamaat’s student front, Shibir, for several reasons. One, of course, had to do with power – who would dominate the university campus?
But the main division was ideological or religio-ideological. To many in BNP, there was more than a hint of arrogance in the Jamaatis’ claim of theirs being the only true interpretation of Islam and in their efforts to impose their version of Islam on the country. To most people in Bangladesh, the Middle East has never been an ideal.
And of course, there was Jamaat’s role in Bangladesh’s history and in particular, in the war of independence. Jamaat was on the wrong side of history in 1971 and opposed the division of Pakistan despite atrocities by the Pakistani army. Many Jamaat leaders were also known to have taken part in atrocities themselves. Years later, after the ban on the party had been lifted and its leader, Ghulam Azam, had returned to now independent Bangladesh, Jamaat as a party refused to acknowledge its role in the atrocities and only accepted independence indirectly – by not publicly advocating a reunification.
Though it largely accepted electoral politics in the 1990s and joined hands with the BNP under Khaleda Zia to form a government, it remained a violent party and was much resented. Activists in Shibir, its student wing, regularly engaged in armed combat with activists from other organisations. One Shibir speciality in the 1990s was to cut the tendons of captured activists from rival organisations – thus incapacitating them for life without inviting the full police investigation that an outright murder would have done.
Again, in 2006, when the BNP government sought to manipulate rules around the caretaker government instrument, Shibir activists played a vital role in the street fighting. And during the unrest in 2013-2014 and again later, during the elections in 2018, for instance, it was Shibir and Jamaat activists that were on the streets throwing bombs and burning buses. Many innocent people died in these confrontations with the police.
It is important, however, to note that there were forces within Jamaat that advocated reform, wanted Jamaat to fully embrace Bangladesh’s independence, and to rid the party of old war criminals. These reformists were prominent in the expanding Jamaat network in business in the 1990s and early 2000s. But eventually they lost out, and the party largely remained under the control of old, conservative forces into the 2010s, with younger activists confined to street activism and to studying Maududi’s established works. In the late 2010s, reformists gained more influence in Jamaat, but in the meantime, the avowedly secular Hasina government had entered an arrangement with another group of Islamists – rivals of Jamaat.
Islamism under Hasina
Jamaat was the ogre Hasina, as prime minister and leader of Awami League, who held up, and she constantly fought. She restricted the party’s activities over the years, but she did not actually ban it until the very end. There were two reasons for this. First, Jamaat was a useful enemy fit for rallying all liberal forces around Hasina despite her authoritarian ways. ‘Me or the enemies of the nation,’ was her appeal. But secondly, Jamaat was not without its sympathisers.
A large-scale survey on attitudes to Islam done around 2016 was abruptly terminated after political pressure because of the findings. The results suggested inter alia that a vast majority of the population favoured ‘sharia’ and believed that the law of the land should be based on Islamic jurisprudence. Nearly equally strong was support for the death penalty for blasphemers and legal measures to prevent youngsters from mixing across genders.
These findings were politically sensitive but not really surprising. A few years earlier, a new Islamist organisation called Hefazat-e-Islam had mobilised possibly as many as one hundred thousand people – mostly young men – for a demonstration of power and protest in Dhaka against blasphemers. The police ‘managed’ the situation at the time, but it followed on the progressive Shahbag protests some months earlier, during which Islamist militants had killed or tried to kill alleged blasphemers, including the editor of this journal. It was clear that the situation was volatile. Awami League leaders with an ear to the ground reported that Islamist sentiments had traction among voters. Subsequently, the ruling party shifted its weight to the other foot and, instead of fighting Islamists, accommodated them – namely, Hefazat.
To most people, ‘Sharia’ probably means ‘justice’ more than it means eighth-century Arab jurisprudence. But misunderstandings aside, support for Islamic values is not surprising. The level of literacy in Bangladesh is not low, but people are often beholden to local mullahs, and conservative ideas emanate from the Middle East through the hundreds of thousands who have been there as workers. The use of hijab has been gaining popularity over the last decade or more, and expressions such as ‘assalam aleikum’ are increasingly common as greetings, while ‘inshallah’ or ‘alhamdulillah’ are much more common now than earlier. Hefazat’s accommodation reflected a trend: the increasingly unpopular government was unable to resist it.
Illiberal Jamaat, or not?
Jamaat is ideologically at odds with Hefazat. Jamaat is more attuned to the modern world and has a clearer political agenda. It represents an Islamic notion of the state. Ideologically, it is more oriented towards the Middle East than towards Hefazat. Although early in its history it was opposed to political involvement, over the decades it has become a political party committed to acquiring political power to change society. Its aim is to create an Islamic society and an Islamic state.
Being beholden to the old guard, it has portrayed itself as an illiberal force. Until this election. During the election campaign, Jamaat’s leader or ameer, Shafiqur Rahman, repeatedly tried to come across as a reformed Islamist. His dress and general appearance leave little doubt about his Islamist leanings, but he actively sought to present himself as a man of relatively modern views. He apologised for Jamaat’s role during the 1971 war of independence, in itself a revolutionary step for the organisation. He also sought to present himself as moderate in terms of societal values, accepting, for instance, that women should be allowed to work outside the home.
In the short reels and videos on social media – a seriously important channel for political communication during this election – he portrayed himself as an energetic but kindly old grandfather-type leader who greeted old and young, Hindus and Muslims alike, making passionate speeches about his visions for the country and anger at corruption and violence, and patting children on the head. His supporters and activists could be seen on roller skates and mimicking the quite catchy songs that became the party’s hallmark.
Shafiqul’s suggestion that women be paid in full but work reduced hours when pregnant or with small children could be and was, by many, seen as an anti-feminist policy designed to keep women at home, while others pointed out that even liberal democracies have special provisions for pregnant women and mothers of small children. It was with regard to women that the challenges of his balancing act were most visible, and in at least one matter, he drew a red line. In a TV interview, he was challenged about the fact that Jamaat fielded no women candidates at all and explained that they had, unfortunately, not been able to find suitable candidates, but hoped to do so next time. But when asked if Jamaat could accept a female leader, the answer was a resolute no.
Are supporters illiberals?
Shafiqur is one thing; the values of Jamaat’s hundreds of thousands of activists and leaders are something entirely different. We should never assume that the ideas propagated by political leaders or parties are wholly embraced by their voters. Political propaganda, as a doctor’s needle that infuses a ready-made cocktail, has long been abandoned by media and communication studies. We need instead to look at how ordinary citizens actively construct, circulate, reinterpret, improvise, and defend the ideas and values that leaders propagate.
When sociologist Hochshield interviewed Trump voters before his first election, back in 2016, she found what she called ‘the deep story’. When Trump supporters talked about the world at large, they conveyed a feeling of having been cheated, of having been promised something that did not materialise. The American dream was that you work hard and in the end you will be rewarded. It was like climbing a hill, and one day, climbing long enough, you would reach the top. But they did not reach the top. It was still far away.
Instead, they felt others were given priority in line, closer to the front, or that someone up there stole the opportunities. The class journey of the parent generation was no longer possible, and the climb had become endless. Disappointment led to resentment, and resentment is a driver in politics as important as patriotism or ideology, a point driven home by many studies of populism and nationalism.
The world does not look the same from Bangladesh as it does from everyday America, but other ‘deep stories’ apply. Some years back, a series of young Jamaat and Shibir activists were interviewed to understand their visions for the future, and more specifically, the attraction of Jamaat to younger generations. The first point they brought up was that they were Bangladeshi nationalists and entertained no desire to reunite with Pakistan.
But they could support Jamaat because, to them, both the enormity of the 1971 war of independence and contemporary Pakistan were distant entities of little relevance today. They did not particularly care about minorities such as Hindus. Their world was one in which technology offered opportunities, education promised social advancement, and their Islamic identity was a source of pride. The Bangladesh promoted by the Awami League was a secular entity, largely defined, in their view, in terms of borrowed foreign values.
Instead, there were other countries, countries that functioned as possible examples for Bangladesh and where Islam held a pride of place in their eyes. They mentioned Malaysia and Turkey more often than the oil-rich Gulf states. Malaysia for its success in economic development and order, and Turkey for its Islamic pride and its increasing international power and presence.
Most crucially, they were angry. What held Bangladesh back, they felt, was a lack of opportunities due to poor governance, corruption, nepotism, and the absence of morality in politics. The rulers of the day, Hasina and her government, were considered not only anti-Islamic but non-Islamic in the sense of amoral. Their corruption held the country back, preventing it from utilising the potential of its youth. When asked why they supported Jamaat, they pointed to bridges that were never finished, roads that crumbled, and large sums stashed away abroad.
How to deal with the illiberals?
There are also reactionaries with stark conservative values within Jamaat, people with authoritarian views. Like any large political party, Jamaat contends with differing views within. Among the general populace living in relative poverty and with little education, these views are not uncommon. They can be encountered in villages all over the country as well as in urban neighbourhoods. Some of them have been to the Middle East as expat workers, while others are steeped in the old-fashioned normative practices propagated by madrassas.
It is, however, important to keep in mind that what fuels Jamaat’s support is not just a desire to create an Islamic state based on eighth-century Arab jurisprudence, but also to see development, sincere rulers, an end to corruption, and roads that do not crumble after the first monsoon rain. Bangladesh has suffered years of neglect and self-serving rulers, and voters are looking for alternatives. Some feel the answer is in BNP, but others are sceptical and have voted for an ideologically more driven Jamaat.
These are important considerations. At the same time, there are reactionary and self-serving forces within Jamaat. Progressive forces will have to fight these without alienating voters who seek a better government for a better future. There is no doubt that Jamaat will benefit from any misstep by the current government – and there will be many missteps, as there invariably are. And by the next election, four years down the line and in the Bangladeshi order of things, Jamaat will be a serious contender for power.
Conclusion
To return to the question of how to deal with the presence of a resurgent illiberal force, there are no short-term answers. But there is perhaps a mid-term answer in the voting system, by not forcing voters to chose one of the two. One voter will vote for Jamaat for x reason, another for y reason. Let them instead vote for different parties and the debate about which interest should prevail be taken in parliament rather than in the voter’s head while deciding in the voting booth. From a Nordic democratic perspective, the proportional representation system is the cornerstone of a representational democracy.
A society consists of a large number of interest and a robust state permits all to be heard as a natural, given right. Their voices should be respected and those who express these interests should be protected and respected. These voices can be feminists, regional interests, agrarian interests, youth, pro-business or anti-business, environmental activists, teetotalers and animal rights activists. A parliament is the state’s most crucial platform for where such voices are heard and countered, where deliberations take place, and where interests are weighed against other interests and against national interests. The FPTP system encourages a two-party system in which one wins and the other looses, and the one that wins dominates to the exclusion of all others. These other voices are marginalised. From a Nordic democratic perspective, diversity should be celebrated and their place in the nation’s highest decision-making institution secured as a central obligation.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.64452/btci5870
